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UNTTSr) STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL IV
SITTING IN THE PALACE OF JUSTICE, NURNBERG, GERr.'lANY
11 APRIL 1949
TliE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA
again st
ERNST VON Vi/EIZSAECKER,
GUSTAV ADOLF STEENGR/iCHT VON MOYLAND,
WILHELM KEPFLER, '
ERNST Vv'ILHELM BOHLE,
ERNST WOERMANN,
KARL RITTER,
OTTO VON ERDmNNSDORFF,
EDMUND VEESENMAYER,
HANS HEINRICH LAMi'.ffiRS,
WILHELM STUCKART,
RICHARD WALTHER DARIvE,
OTTO IViEXSSNEK,
OTTO DIETRICH,
GOTTLOB BEKGEK,
WALTER SCHELLEI'TBEKG,
LUTZ SCPTYfERiM vON KKOSIGK,
EMIL PUHI..,
KARL RASCHE,
PAUL KOELNER
PAUL PLEIGER and
HANS KEHRL,
•V:' •:
Defendants
Case No. 11
JUDGrffiNT 01' THE TRIBUITAL
.ii.v
William C. Cbristianaon, Presiding Judge
Leon Powers, Judge
Robert P. Maguire, Judge
tee ihtited status or alo^irica
a,o:ainst
3RITST VOIT VEIZSAECISR, GUSTAV ADOLF
STLEITGRACKT VGE EOyL/ATD, V1LK2U:
lOilPPDOR, ERIiST L'TLHELi.: SOIIir, LREST
V/OLRLlAini, rJlRL RITTSR, OTTO VOiT
LRDIL'VirrTSDORPP, PDI.IUIID VLSSEiri.TTiPE,
HAITS I-ISIl^IRICH LAI^RIERS,
STUCrj\RT, RICIR\RD L'ALTIiLR DARRL,
OTTO I.ILI3S1ICR, OTTO DISTRICH,
GOTTLOB HSRGLR, L-ALTTR SCflELLEITDLPvG,
LUTZ SCIIV.TjRIN VOE KROSIGK, LniL PUHL,
IBVRL RASCIIL, PAUL KOLRITER, PAUL
PL2IGLR and IIAilS ICEHRL
Defendants
CASS UO. 11
JUDGIL^ilT
On 15 November, 1947, an Indictment against the above-
named defendants was filed wUth the Secretary General of the
U, S, Military Tribunals at Uin'nberg, Generally stated, said
Indictment, consisting of eight counts, charged the defendants
with having comriiitted crimes against peace, v;ar crimes, crimes
against humanity, and with having participated in a conmon
plan and consplracy to commit crimes against peace all as
defined in Control Council Lav; ITo. 10, duly enacted by the
Allied Control Council on 20 December, 1945.
Several, but not all, of the defendants are charged
under each of the coimts of the Indictment. The applicable
provisions of Control Comicil Lav; ITo. 10 will hereinafter be
referred to and set forth as they relate to each count of the
Indictment, when such counts are reached for discussion and
decis ion.
AThe Indictment was served upon all of the
defendants in the German language, more than thirty
days "before arraignment of the defendants thereunder.
On 19 December, 1947, the case was assigned to this
Tribunal for trial by the Supervisory Committee of
Presiding Judges of t bj8 b, S. Military Tribunals in
Germany, in conformity with Article V of Military
✓ •
Government Ordinance llo, 7, as amended, this Tribunal
theretofore having been duly established and consti-
tuted, pursuant to'said Ordinance lio. 7, vjhich ordi
nance w^s promulgated by the U, s. Military Governor
of the TJ, S, Occupation Zone of Germany on 18 October
1946. The arraignment of the defendants took place on
20 December, 1947, at v/hich time all defendants pleaded
Hot Guilty to the cliarges In the Indictment.
Throughout the trial of this case, all of the
defendants were represented by German counsel of their
own choice. One defendant requested that he also be
allowed to retain American counsel to represent him.
The request was granted.
The presentation of evidence in the case v;as
commenced ..on 7 January, 1948. Final arguments before
^ the Tribunal v/ere concluded on IB povember, 1948. The
transcript record of the cose consists of 28,085 pages.
In addition thereto, the prosecution and the defense
together introduced in evidence 9,067 documentary ex
hibits, totalling-over o9,000 pages, Generally accepted
technical rules of evidence were not adhered to during
-2-
-1'^
••.r
the trial, and any evidence that, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, had probative value, v?aa admitted when
offered by either the prosecution or the defense. This
practice was in accord with that followed by the Inter
national Military Tribunal, and as subsequently thereto
provided in Section VII of the hereinbefore referred to
Military Government Ordinance IIo. V. In the interest of
expedition the Tribunal, following the practice adopted
by the International Ililitary Trib^anal, appointed court
commissioners to assist in taking both oral and docu
mentary evidence, but many of the principal witnesses
and all of the defendants viho testified were heard be
fore the Tribunal itself.
In order that any relevant documentary defense
evidence of v.hich the defcncisnts had loiowledge, ,or
which they believed existed, might bo made available
to the defense, the Tribunal, in response to various
defense motions, uniformly ordered that the persons
or agencies having posscssio]:! or custody of such evi
dence make same available to the defense. This v/as
even true with respect to documentary evidence in
possession of the prosecution. Horeover, at the request
of a number of the defendants, the Tribunal appointed a
Gorraan research analyst, of t ho defendants choice, for
the purpose of making a search of files of the former
Reich government, located in the Documentary Center in
Derlin, under Allied control. Such research analyst
spent many months in Berlin in this search for defense
^3^
evidence. The ssmc research expert v^cs further author
ized hy this Tribunal to visit London for the purposes
of research, in behalf of the defendants, and was, in
fact, so engaged for a number of weeks with the coopera
tion of British authorities. Other representatives yiqvq
likewise authorized to make search of former I7eich govern
ment files in Berlin.
In arriving at the conclusions hereinafter reached,
with respect to the charges against the defendants, as
contained in the Indictment, the Tribunal has undeviatingly
adhered to the proposition that a defendant is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the course of the trial, a motion v;as made
in behalf of all defendants charged in Count Pour of the
Indictment that said count be stricken. The motion was
granted and a formal order in the matter made and filed
by tho Tribunal.
During tho trial from timo to time, motions were
also made in behalf of individual defendants, to dismiss
counts of the Indictment rolcting to them, on the ground
that tho Tribmal v;os without jurisdiction to try the
defenaanus on such counts, and on the further ground that
the evicicncc adduced by the prosecution was insufficient
to sustain tho charges. Such motions were denied without
prejudice, excepting in tliroe instances, v/here charges
in certain counts of the Indictment were dismissed, with
respect to certain defendants, because of a failure of
proof. Specific attention to the charges thus dismissed,
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and the aefenaonts affectea tl-xirehy, rill he made when
the charges involved in snch dismissals are reached in
the ensuing discussion of the individual counts of the
IndicGment, Like attention will he called to instances
wherein the pro3ecution,during the trial, withdrew cer
tain charges against certain of tho defendants.
In the final arguments and briefs of the defendants,
the contention that this Tribunal is without jurisdiction
in this rnatuer was renewed. In this connection, attention
is.directed to the fact that a number of U.S. Lilitary
Tribunals, of precisely the same type and origin as this
one, have heretofore had their jurisdiction questioned
on similar grounds in the course of their trial of cases
Involving offenses defined in Control Council Low Uo. 10.
(Flick, ot cl. Case Uo, 5; List ct al, Case IJo. 7; and
Ohlcndorf, ot al, Case ITo, 9.) The statements made in
the judgments of such oases, in the course of disposing
of the attacks made on the jurisdiction of such Tribunals,
we deem to be conclusive answers to the challenge here
made to this Tribunal's jurisdiction, ondwc accordingly
reject the contention of the defendants that these pro
ceedings should be dismissed because of the Tribunal's
lack of jurisdiction.
The record, including briefs of counsel, all of
which the court has considcroc] and examined, amounts to
Spproximately 79,000 pages. The evidence of this case
presents a factual story of practically overy phase of
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activity of the hazi Party ant? of the Thirt^. Reich, whether
political, economic, industrial, financial or military^
Huncreds of captured official documents were offered,
received and considered., which were unavailable at the trial
before the International Military Tribunal (sometimes herein
referred to as the IMT), and which were not offered in any of
the previous cases before United States Military Tribunals,
and the record here presents, more fully and completely than
in any other case, the story of the rise of the ^ '^azi regime,
Its programs and its acts.
The Tribunal has had the aid of, and hero desires to
express its appreciation and gratitude for, t^c s'^ill, learn
ing and meticulous care with which counsel for the prosecution
and defense have presente'^ their case.
Notwithstanding the oro'^dsions in Article 10 nf Ordi
nance 7, t-hat the determination of the International Military
/ Tribunal, that invasi'^ns, aggressive acts, aggressive wars,
crimes, atrocities and inhumane acts were planned or occurred,
shall be binding on the Tribunals established thereunder and
caii-iOt be questioned except insofar as the oartlcipa.tlon
therein and knowledge thereof of any particular person may be
concerned, we have permitted the defense to offer
evidence upon 0.11 these matters. In so doing we have
^ not considered this article to be a limitation on the
A
right of the Tribunal to consider pny evidence which
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may Icaci to a just determination of tho facts. If in
this WG have erred, it is an error which v;g do not ro-
gret, as v;-a are firmly convinced that coirrts of justice
must always remain o.pen to the ascertainment of the
truth and tliat every defendant must be accorded an oppor
tunity to present the facts.
Before considering the questions of lav; and fact
which are here involved, wo deem it proper to state the
nature of thesd trials, the basis on viiich they rest,
and the standards by which these defendants should be
judged.
Those Tribunals wore not organ±zccl and do not sit
for the purpose of wreahlng vengeance upon tho conquered.
#
Was such the purpose, tho power existed to use tho firing
) • ^
squad, the scaffold, or the ;-rj.son camp, without taking
the time and putting forth labor which have been so freely
expended on them, and the Allied Pc-'Ors would have copied
the methods which wore too often u.sed during the Third
Reich, We may not, in justice, apply to these defendants
because they are Germans, standards of duty and responsi
bility v.iiich arc not equally applicable to the officials
of tho Allied Pov/ers and to those of •all nations. ITor
should Germans be c onvictod for acts or conducts v/hich,
if cprrmiittod by Americans,British, French or Russians
would not subject them to legal trial and conviction.
Both care and caution must bo oxercisod not to prescribe
or C'pply a yardstick to those defendants which cannot
and should not bo applied to others, irrespoctivo of
whether they arc nationals of the victor or oftho van
quished.
-7-
^ The dofcndants hove ere charged mth violation
or international loiv, and our task is? First, to ascer
tain and determine v/hat it is, and Second^ Y;hethcr the
defendants have infringed these principles.
International Lav; is not statutory. It is in
part defined hy and described in^treaties and covenants
among the pov/ers of the world.. ITevcrtheloss, much of it
^ consists of practices, principles and standards vAiich
have become developed over tho years and have found gonoral
accexDtanco among tho clviliaod powers of the v/orld. It has
grown and expanded as the concepts of International right
and wrong have grown. It has never been suggested tha.t it
has been codified, or that its boundaries have boon speci
fically defined, or that sjeocific sanctions have boon pro
scribed for violations of it. The various Hague and
Geneva Conventions, tho Constitutions and Charter of tho
League of Nations, and the Hollogg-Brland treaties have
given definitive shape to limited fields of international
law. It can bo said that in so far as certain acts are
prohibited or permitted by thoso treaties or covenants,
a codification exists and specific rules of conduct pre
scribed. It docs not f ollov.', however, that they are
%
exclusive^ and assuredly, it cannot bo said that they
cover or pretend to cover the entire field of international
lav;.
In determining whether tho a ction of a nation is
in accordance with or violates international lav;, resort
may be had not only to those treaties and covenants, "tout
*
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to treatises on the subject and t o the principles v/hich
lie beneath and back of those treaties, covenants and
learned treatises, and v/e need not hesitate after liaving
determined v/hat they are, to aiaply them to ncv; or dif
ferent situations. It is by this very means that all
legal codes, civil or criminal, have developed.
Aggressive ^7ars and Invasions. The question, therefore,
is whether or not the London Charter and Control Council
Law ko, 10 define new offenses or v/hethcr they are but
definitive statements of pre-existing international law.
That monarchs and states, at least those who considered
themselves civilized, have for centuries recognized that
aggressive wars and invasions violated the Law of Hatlona
is evident from the fact that invariably he who started
his troops on the march, or his fleets over the seas to
✓
wage war, has endeavored to explain and justify the act
by asserting that there was no desire or intent to in
fringe upon the lav/ful rights of the attacked nation, or
to engage in cold-blooded conquest, but on the contrary
that the hostile acts became necessary because of the
enemy^s disregard of Its obligations; that it had violated
treaties, that it held provinces or cities which in fact
belonged to the attacker, or that It had mistreated or
discriminated against his peaceful citizens.
Often those justifications and excuses were offered
v,'ith cjTiical disregard of the truth. Novcrtholoss, it
was felt necessary that an excuse and justification be
-9-
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;offered for the attack to the end the attacker ral^ht
not ho rc^ardod by other nations as ccting in v/'cnton
disregard of international duty and responsibility.
Prom Caesar to Hitler the same practice has been fol-
lov/od. It was used by lyapolcon, was adopted by Frodorick
the Great, by Phi'lip II of 3pain, by Edward I of England,
of Louis XIV of Prance, and b y the povrers who seized
lands which thoy desired to colonise and make their ov/n.
Every and all of the attackers followed the sane timc-
\7orn practice. The white, the blue, the yellow, black and
the red books had only one pvu^poso, namely, to justify
that v/hich was othcriviso unjustifiable.
But if aggressive invasions and wars wore lawful
and did not constitute a breach of international law and
duty, why toko the troublo to explain and justify? ^^hy
inform neutral nations that thowar wa_s inevitable and
excusable and based on high notions of morality, if aggros-
sivo war was not essentially v/rong and a breach of inter
national lcv>'? The ansv/er to this is obvious. The initiation
'of wars and invasions, v/ith their attendant horror and
suffering, has for centuries been universally recognized
by all civilized nations as wrong, to be resorted to only
as a last resort to romody wrongs already or imminently
to be inflicted, I^e hold that aggressive '• ara and inva
sions have, since time immomorial, been a violation of
international lav/, oven though specific sanctions v/ero not
provided.
The Kellogg-Brland Pact not only recognized that
aggressive wars and invasions were in violation of
-10-
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intcrnrtion.?! lav, but proceeded to take the next step,
namely, to condemn recourse to v/er (otherviso justifiablo
for the solution of international controversies), to
renounce it as an instrumentality of national policy, and
' to provide for the settlement of all disputes or conflicts
by pacific moans. Thus v.-ar.as a means of cnforcins la.v/ful
claims and d craands became unlav/ful. The risht of self-
defense, of course, vas naturally preserved, but only
%
becaviso if rcsi stance v; as not immediately offered, a nation
vould be overrun and conquered before it could obtain the
jud :racnt, of any international authority that it v;as justi
fied in resisting, attack.
The preamble of tho treaty provides that the nations
doclaro their conviction
"that any signatory povor which shall hero-
after seek to promote its national interest
by resort to war should bo denied the bene
fits furnished by tho Treaty."
Quincy v.'right, Professor of International Law,
University of Chicago, in January 1933 (American Journal
of International Law, Volume 21, ITo. 1, January 23, 1933),
reviews tho Pact and tho conclusions put upon, and the
implications arising from its provisions by the leading
statesmen of that time. Ho ^iiotcs Secretary Stimson as
follows I
"Under the former concept of inter-^
national law, when a conflict occurred it
was usually doomed the ooncern only of the
partiVs to the conflict • * .But now, under
t,he covenant and tho Briand-Kellogg Pact,
the conflict becomes of legal concern to
everybody connected with the Treaty. All
steps taken to enforce the Treaty must be
-11-
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adjudged by thla'nov; situation.. As was
said by M.Briand, quoting the vjords of
President Coolidges
*An Act of v/ar in any part of
the world is an act that
injures the-interests of my
country. *
"The \vorld has learned that great
lesson and the execution of the Kellogg-
Briand Treaty codified it."
Professor bright continuess
"Furthermore, the suggestion that the
obligation is not legal because it is unpro
vided with sanctions has carried no more weight.-
I'any treaties have no specific sanctions but
insofar as they create obligations under inter
national law, those obligations are covered by
the sanctions of all international lav/.-..
"In his exposition of the treaty. Secre
tary Ilellogg pointed out ^thcre can be no ques
tion as a matter of law, that the violation of a
multilateral anti-war treaty tlirough resort to
war by one narty thereto would automatically
release the" other parties from their obligations
to the treaty-breaking states. Any express recog
nition of this principle of law is wholly uiineces-
sary^ ....
"These changes in international law conse
quent upon the Gxistenco of war, arise from the
following propositionss
"1. A Party to the Pact responsible for
initiating a state'of war (a primory belligerent)
will have violated the rights of all the parties
to the Pact and will have lost all title to its
benefits from non-participating states as well as
from its enemies.
"2. A Party to the Pact involved in a state
of war but not responsible for initiating it (a
secondary belligerent) •••ill not have violated the
Pact and conse'uently v.-ill continue entitled to its
benefits not only from non-participating states
but also from its onomies..
"3. The other Parties to the Pact, non-
participating in the war or ^partial', v/hile free
to keep out of the ^'ar, will have suffered a '
legal injury tlirougli the outbreak of war, and,
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though hound to oxtond the full hcnoflts of
the trcditiono.l intornctionol lev; of neutral
ity as well as the benefits of the Pact to the
secondary 'bclligeront, v;lll be free to deny
those benefits .to the nrimary belligerent,"
It is to be noted that those vieivswere expressed
long before the seizure of vo\igt by Hitler, and the iTazi
Party, and years before the occurrence of the a cts of
aggression here charged and arc contemporaneous conclu
sions regarding the intent, moaning, and scope of the
Treaty.
Is there personal responsibility for those '.vho plan,
prepare and initiate aggressive•ars and invasions? The
defendants have ably and earnestly urged that heads of
states and officials thereof cannot be held personally
responsible for initiating or w aging aggressive v;ars and
invasions because no penalty had been previously proscribed
for such acts. History, however, reveals that this view is
fallacious, Prcdprlck the Great was summoned by the
Imperial Council to appear at Regensburg and answer, under
throat of banishment, for his alleged breach of the public
peace in invading ,3axony. '
'Then ITapolcon, in alleged violation of his interna
tional agrocment, sailed frcmfillba to regain by force the
Imperial Crovm of Rranco, the nations of Europe, including
many Gorman Princes, in solemn conclave, denounced him,
outlawing him as an enemy and disturber' of the peace, mus-
y
terod their armies, and on the battlefield of Waterloo,
enforced their decroo and applied tho sentence by banishing
him to St. Ilclona. By those actions they recognized and
-13-
ideclared that personal punishment could he properly in-
"Lipon a head of state ivho violated an xnberna tional
agreement and resorted to aggressive war.
But even if history furnished no exaraples, vr e v/ould
have no hesitation in holding that those who prepare, plan
or initiate aggressive Invasions and vr age aggressive wars
and those •'.iho knowingly participate therein are subject to
trial, and if convicted, to pimishment.
By the i'^ellogg-Brland Treaty, Germany, as v/ell as
practically every other civilized country of the v;orld,
renounced war as an instrumentality of governmental policy.
The treaty was entered into for the benefit of all. It
recognised the fact that once war breaks out, no one can
foresee how far or to v/hat extent the flames will spread,
and that, in this rapidly shrinking world, it affects the
interest of all.
ITo one would question the right of any signatory to
use its armed forces to halt the violator in his tracks
and to rescue the country attacked. Nor v/ould there be
any question but that, V'hen this was successfully accom
plished, sanctions could be applied a gainst the guilty nation.
\7hy then can they not be applied to the individuals by whose
decisions, cooperation and implementation the unlav/ful war
or Invasion was initiated and vjaged? T^ust the punishment
always fall on those who were not personally responsible?
ray the humble citizen, :;ho knew nothing of the reasons
for his country's.action, who may have been utterly deceived
by ?-ta propaganda, be subject to death or v/ounds in battle.
-14-
Vheld as a prisoner of v/sr, see his home destroyed hy
artillery or from the air, he compelled to see his
-wife and family suffer privations and hardships; may
the owners and workers in industry see it destroyed,
their merchant fleets sunk, the mariners drowned or
interned; may Indemnities result v/hich must he derived
from the taxes paid by the ignorant and the innocent;
Hay all this occur and those v;ho wore actually respons
ible escape?
The only rationale which would sustain the con
cept that :the responsible shall escape while the innocent
public suffers, is a result of the old theory that "the
King can do no v/rong" and that "v/ar is the sport of Kings".
lii/e may point out furthun that the Geneva Conven
tion relating to Rules of Land ^"arfare and the Treatment
if Prisoners of '"ar provide no punishment for t he individ
uals who violate those rules, but it cannot be questioned
that he who murders a prisoner of war is liable to punish
ment ,
To permit such immunity Is to shroud international
law in a mist of unroality. We reject it and hold that
those who plan, prepare. Initiate andw age aggressive
wars and invasions, and those who knowingly, consciously
and roaponsibily participate therein violate international
law and may be tried, convicted and punished for their
acts •
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The "Tu '^ueque" Doctrines The defendants have offered
testimony ands upported it hy official documents v/hich
tend to estahlish that the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics entered into a treaty with Germany In August,
1941, T?hich contains secret clauses whereby not only did
Russia consent to Hitler's invasion of Poland, but at
least tacitly agreed to send its ovm armed forces against
that nation, and by it could demand and obtain its share-
of tho loot, and was given a free hand to sv;allow the
little Baltic States with whom it had thon existing non-
aggression treaties. The defense asserts that Russia,
bbing itself an aggressor and an accomplice to Hitler's
aggression, v/as a p^rty and an accomplice to at least
one of tho aggressions charged in this Indictment, namely
that against Poland, and therefore was legally inhibited
from signing tho London Charter and enacting Control
Council Law llo. 10, and consequently both the Charter and
lav; are invalid and no prosecution can be maintained
undor them.
The justifications, if any, which the Soviet
Union may claim to have had for its actions in this
respect, were not represented to this Tribunal. But if
wc assume, arguendo, that Russia's octionwas wholly
untenable and its g^ilt as deep as that of the Third
Reich, nevertheless, this cannot, in law, avail the
defendants or lessen the 'guilt of those of the Third
Roich v;ho were themselves responsible. Neither the Lon
don iCharter nor Control Council Lav; No. 10 did more than
declare existing international law regarding aggrosalvo
-16-.
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Wars cind invasions. The Charter and Cantrol Council
Lav; rTo. 10 merely defined what offenses against inter
national lav/ should bo the subject of judicial inquiry,
formed the international Hilitary Tribunal, and author
ized the sirrnatory powers to set up additional Tribunals
to try those charged v/ith couimitting crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
^ But even if it wore true that the London Charter
and Control Council Lav; No. 10 arc legislative acts mak-
ing that a crime which before as not so. recognized, would
the defense argument be valid? It has never been suggested
that a lav; duly passed becomes ineffective when it trans
pires that one of the legislators whose vote enacted it
was himself guilty of the aamo practice or that he him-
* ^ self intended, in the future, to violate the law.
%
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COUNT ONH]
CRIi^ES AGAIU3T ?£ACS
The defendants VJEIZSASCKER, KEPPLER, BOHLE, 'vOSKlOTJ,
RITTER, ERBI^liU'^ NSDORFF, VEESENMYER, LAMl^RS, STUCKART, DARKS, '
i-'jjI33NER, DIETRICH, BERGER, SCHELLENBERG, SCHWSRIN-KROSIGK,
KQjijRivER and PL^IGER are charged with having narticipated in
the initiation aiid invasion of other countries and wars of
aggression, including but not limited to planning, preparation,
initiation and waging of wars of aggression and wars in viola
tion of international treaties, agreements and assurances.
The invasions and wars referred to end the da.tes of their
initiations are alleged to have been as follows:
Austria 12 March 19.-^8
Czechoslovakia 1 October 19A8 and 15 March 191^9
Poland. 1 September 1959
United Kingdom an"" France ? September 19-*^9
Denmark and Norway 9 April 1940
Belgium, Netherlands ^nd Luxembourg 10 1940
Yugoslpvia. an'' Greece 6 April 1941
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics June 1941
United Sta"^es of America 11 December 1941
The proeecuticn dismissed t^is count as to the defend
ants BOHLE, ERDIvJiNNSDORFF and MEI33NER.
Notwithstanding the fact that the International ^''^ili-
tary Tribunal and several of these Tribunals have decided
that the Third Reich was guilty of aggressive wars and
invasions, we h£.-ve re-examined this question because of
the claim made by the defense that newly discovered
evidence reveals that Germany was not the aggressor.
It should be made clear, however, that this defense
-18-
is not auTomlttcd by all of the defendants, ror example,
the defendant VlHIZSAECISEx^. fi-'eely admits that these acts
v/erc a^gneasiona.
The argument is based on the alleged injustices and
harsh tarnls of the Versailles Treaty, '.vhich it is claimed
Y:as imposed upon Germany by force; that agreements made
under duress are not binding, and, in attempting to rid
itself of the bonds thus tlirust upon it, Germany v/as com
pelled to use force and in s o doing cannot be judged an
aggressor. Unless the defense has sufficient legal merit
necessitating our so doing, a review of the treaty and the
reasons v.hich underlie it and its terms, v;ith a view to
determining the accuracy of"these claims, would expand our
opinion beyond permissible limits. In our opinion, however,
there is no substance to the defense, irrespective of the
quGstlon whether the treaty was just or v.1acther it was
imposed by duress.
\7e deem it unnecessary to determine either the truth
of these claims or ?;hether one, upon whom the victor, hy
force of arms, has imposed a treaty on unjust or unduly
harsh terms, may therefore reject the treaty and, by force
of arms, attempt to regain that v/hlch it believes has boon
wrongfully wrested from it.
If, arg^uendo, both propositions were conceded, neverthe
less both are irrelevant to the question confronting us
here. In any event the timo must arrive when a given status,
irrespective of the means ivhei'oby it came into being, must
be considered as fixed, at loact so far as a resort to an
aggressive means of correction is concerned.
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v;hen Hitlsr solcinnly informed the world thet so
far as territorial questions were concorncd Germany had
ho claims, and by means of solemn treaty assured Austria,
Franco, Czechoslovakia and Poland, that he had no terri
torial demands to be made upon them, and v.hcn he entered
into treaties of peace and non-aggrossion v/ith them, the
status of repose and fixation was reached. These assm^ancea
v/ere given and these treaties entered into v/hen there could
be no claim of existing compulsion. Thereafter aggressive
acts against the territories of these nations bocame breaches
of international lav;, prohibited by the provisions of the
1
Kcllogg-Brland Treaty to v/hich Germany had become a volun
tary signatory'".
Ho German could thereafter look upon war or invasion
to recover part or all of the territories of v;hich Germany
had been deprived by the Treaty of Versailles as other
than aggressive. To excuse aggressive acts after these
treaties and assurances took place is merely to assort
that no treaty and no assurance by Germany is binding
and that the pledged word of Germany is valueless. It
is, therefore, particularly vmfortunate both for the
present :nd the future of the German people, that such a
defense should be raised as it tends to create doubt when,
if at all, the nations of the world can place reliance upon
Gorman international obligations.
Czochoslovaklai On IG October 1929, Germany entered into
a treaty with Czechoslovakia, Article I of Part 1 of which
provides that all disputes of any kind between Germany and
Czechoslovakia, which it may not be possible to settle
—SO**
amicably by normal moans of diplomacy, should be sub
mitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or
to a permanent court of international justice, and it
v;as agreed that the disputes referred to include those
mentioned in Article XIlI of the Covenant of the League
of ITations.
^ •
On 11 and 12 I.Iarch 1938, the Hitler government
r.e-assurod Czechoslovakia that the developments in Austria
,vz-duld in no ^vay have any detrimental influence upon the
rolatlons of the G-orman Reich and that state, emphasizing
the continued earnest endeavor on the part of Germany to
improve those mutual rblations. The Czechs v;ero so
cssu.rGd hy Gocring rho gave his '•'\'iovd of honor'', and by
von ITeurathjthen iPorcign 1-Iinistor, v/ho officially assured
the Czech Minister, Mastny, on behalf of Hitler, that
Germany still considered herself bound by the German-
Czech Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in
October 1925, von Mackonson of the Foreign Office
gave further assurances that the clarification of the
Austrian situation would tend to improve Gcrman-Czochoslovakian
relations.
Austria? On 21 May 1935, Germany assured Austria that it
neither intended nor wished to intervene in the domestic
affairs of th?t State, or annex, or attach that country
to hor. On 11 July 1935, Hitler entered into an agreement
with Austria containing, among other things, the provision
that the German government roco^:nized the full sovereignty
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of the Federal State of Austria and in the sense of
the pronouncement of the German leader and Chancellor
of 21 !.:ay 1935.
Bv the Treaty of Versailles, Article- 40, Germany
aclaiowledged and agreed to respect strictly the independ
ence of Austria i^ithln the .boundaries which might be
fixod in the treaty between the states and the principal
Allied and Associated pov/ors, and further agreed that
this independence should be inalienable., except by the
consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
Polands On 15 October 1925,, Germany, at Locarno, entered
into a l^reaty with Poland which recited that the. contracting
parties were equally resolved to maintain peace between them
by assuring the po aceful sot'oleTiient of dificrences 'whu.ch
might arise between the two countries and declared i/hat
respect for the rights established by troauy or resulting
from the law of nations was obligatory for international
tribunals, that the rights of a state could not be modified
save with its consent, and that all disputes of every hind
betv;oen Germany and Poland, which it v; a a not possible to
settle amicably by normal methods of diplomacy, should be
submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or
to an intemational court of ;]u3tice.
On 26 January 1934 Gorniany and Poland signed a non-
aggression pact which provided, among other things, that
undor no circumstances would either party proceed to use
force for the purpose of settling disputes.
...
On 7 March, 1936, Hitler announcca; "V/e have no
territorial demands to tnako in Europe", On 20 February
1938, Hitler, in a speech, said:
"In our relations v/ith the state with
which v;e had had perhaps the greatest differences,
not only has there hoon a dotonto, hut in the
ccurso of years there has been a constant improve
ment in relations • • .The Polish state respects
the national conditions in this state and both
the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish
rights," And so the way to an imderstanding has'
been successfully paved, an understanding VJhich,
beginning v/ith Danzig has today,'in spite of the
attempts of many mischief makers, finally suc
ceeded in taking the poison out of the relations
of Germany and Poland and transforming them into
a sincere and friendly cooperation,"
On 26 September 1938, Hitler saids
"In Poland there ruled not a democracy but
a man, and with him X succeeded in precisely tv/elve
months in coming to an agreement which, for ten
years, to begin v;ith, entirely removed the danger
of conflict. V/e arc all convinced that this agree
ment will bring lasting pacification,"
On 24 Hovombor. 1938, Hcitel issued orders based on
Ilitlor^s instructions of 21 October that preparations be
made to enable German troops to occupy the Free City of
Danzig by surprise.
Denmark and ITorwa;/; On 31 Hay 1939 Germany and Denmark
entered into a non-aggreasion pact in which they agreed!
"That in no case shall either country resort
to v/ar or any other use of force, one against
the other,"
On 28 August 1939, the defendant V/EIZSAECKaH assured
the Danish Minister of Germany's intention to abide by the
terms of this Pact.
On r2 September 1939, Gei-many assured Norv/oy that
in viev; of tiie friendly relations existing betv/een them
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it would, under no circumatcncGs, prejudice the invlola-
"bilit:" or neutrality of Hprway, and on 6 October 1939,
Germany aGcin assured ITorway that It had never had any
conflicts of interest oreven points of controversy with
the northern states, "and neither has she any today,"
and that Sweden and Horway had both been offered non^
aggression pacts and refused them solely because they
did not feel themselves threatened in any v;ay.
Belgium; On 13 January 1937, Hitler stated that Germany
had, "and hero I repeat, solcKinly" given assurances time
and again that, for instance, bet""cen Germany and Franco
there cannot bo any humanly concoivablo points of contro
versy; that the Gorman government had given the assurance
to Belgium and Holland that it was prepared to recognize
and gua.rantco the Inviolability of those territories, ,
This was roitorotcd on 26 August 1939, and v/as again
rcnev/ed on 6 October, of that 3'oar. At that very timo,
by Hitler's order, the chiefs of the German army were
engaged in planning and preparing the invasions of those
countries.
Yugoslavia s On 28 April 1938, the German government,
through the defendant V/HIlSxilCIlZR, stated that having
become reunited with Austria, it would consider the
frontiers of Italy, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Lichtcnstein
✓
and Hungaryss inviolable, and that the Yugoslavian
government had been informed by authoritative German
circles that German policy had no aims beyond Austria,
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anfl that the Yugoslavian Prontior v;ould, in no case,
he assaultccl, Y/hen in'iSoJiteniher, 1939, Heeren, hinistor
to Yugoslavia, reported that there v/as increased
anxiety there ower tj©rmany*s military intentions and
requested that some kind of announcement he made to
alleviate local fears, the defendant Y/EIZSAECIYS replied
that in viev/ of Hitler's recent speech declaring that^
Germany's houndaries to the west and south v/ere final,
y it would not appear necessary to aay more unless new
occasions for reissuing reassuring communiques to Yue-^-
^ slavia should arise.
On 6 Octoher 1939, Hitler gave Yugoslavia the
following asauranco %
".After the completion of- the Anschluss
I informed Yugoslavia that from nov- on the
houndaries with this.country would also ho
an inviolahle one, and thatwc only desire
to live in friendship and peace with her.
V/hat reliance could ho placed on Gorman pledges
is revealed hy the minutes of the Hitler-Ciano meeting
of 12 Aiogust. 1939, where Hitler stated:
"Generally speaking, it would ho hest
to liquidate the'pseudo-neutrals one after
another-. This is fairly easily done if the
Axis partner protects the roar of the other
v/ho is just finishing oi^f one of the uncer
tain neutrals and vice verse. Italy might
consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral.
gusslc: On 23 August 1939, Germany entered into a non-
aggression treaty nith nussia, providing for arbitral com-
mlsions in case of any dispute and on the same day ontsred
into a secret protocol with tho Soviet Union that, in the
event of n tGrritorlal and political rearrangement in the
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ran \ \i i I I'l iHlTiffli r 11 Mmi ' i ii rt\
areas "belonging to Finland, Estonia and Lithuania, the
northern boundaries of Lithuania should rcpreaont the
boundaries of spheres of influence betv;ccn Germany and
Russia, and that the spheres of Germany and Paissia in •
Poland should be bound by the rivers Narcv/, Bistula
^ ,
and San, and declared Germany's complete political dis
interest in the Soviet claims in Bessarabia,
* ^4
On 28 September 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union
entered into a boundary and friendship agreement which
✓
divided Poland botv.'oen them, end firod their mutual houn-
darics, and on the same date entered into a soorot supple-
4
mentar^'" protocol which amended that of August 23, putting
the Lithuanian state within the sphere of Soviet influence
and Lublin and parts of V/arsaw in the German sphere.
On the same day the two nations entered into a
further agreement declaring that Germany and Russia v/ould
direct their common efforts jointly, and with other friendly
powers if occacicn arises, tov:ard putting an end to the war
betv.'ocn Germany and England and Franco, and that if those
4
efforts remained fruitless, this failure would demonstrate
the fact that Ln.gland and Franco wore rosponsiblo for the
conditions of the war, and Germany and Russia would engage
in mutual consultations r/ith regard to necessary measures.
Such wore the treaties, nevertheless, as was found
by the Ii^itcrnational Military tribunal, as early as the
late sumer of 1940, Germany began to make preparations for
on attack on the Soviets in spite of the non-aggrcssion
Poet,
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The German Ambassador in rioscov; reported that
the Govict Union ?;ould nso to war only if attacked.
Russia had fulfilled not only its obliniations \xnder
the political treaty, hut those arising out of the
commorcial treaty.
The claim now made that Russia intended to attack
Germany is without foundation. It expressed concern over
the large German troop conccntrationsih iRumania, which
were of such size that the German explanation that they
wore intended to prevent the British from establishing
b Saloniklan front v/as obviously false, but there is no
substantial evidence that Russia intended to attack
Germany, - its concern was -that it might become the
attacked.
In addition tb all spocchos, assurances and treaties,
Germany had signed the kellogg-Bricnd Pact, which not only
proscribed aggressivewars between nations, but abandoned
' war as an instrument of governmental policy and substituted
conciliation and arbitration for it. One of its most
important and far-reaching provisions was that it implicitly
authorized the other nations of the world to take such
measures as they might dcem^proper or necessary to punish
the transgressor. In short, it placed the aggressor outside
the society of nations. The Rollogg-Briand Pact, hoii/eVer,
did not attempt to cither prohibit or limit the right of
self-defense, but it is implicit, both in its word and
spirit, that he who violates the treaty is subject to
disciplinary action on the part of the other signauories
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snd thc.t he who initiates aggressive war loses the
right to claim self-defense a'jainst those who seek to
enforce the Treaty. This v/as merely the embodiment in
international law, of a long established principle of
criminal law;
•'There can be no self-defense o'-iainst self-defense.''
(I T^^/harton Criminal Law, 12th Edition, p. 180)
The Indictment charges that German aggression
started with the forcible annexation of Austria. It is
not urged that this action arose because of any fear of
aggression by that state, or that it had planned or pro
posed to join any other state in any aggrossiye action
against Germany. That Hitler planned to seize both Austria
and Czechoslovakia v/ithout regard to the v/ishes of those
people is clear from his statements made at the famous
secret conferences of 5 Ho^cmber 1937, and 23 November
1939.
The Austro-IIungarian Empire ^"as dissolved at the
end of the Pirtt World War, and by the Treaty of Versailles
Austria became an independent and sovereign state. At that
time, and at least during most of the time of the Weim^ir
Republic, there was a strong desire on the part of Austria
to join Germany.
Notwithstanding attempts to conceal ultimate objec
tives and palpable deceptive disclaimers by official
Germany and by the Nazi Party of any desire to interfere
in Austrian affairs, it became obvious that by fair means
or foul the Hitler regime intended and proceeded to sub
sidize, direct and control the Austrian members of the
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Party, and thrt those offorts v;ere directed to^-ard the
annexation of t ho country. I-To agreement vas t^iado which
v/as not violated, none wore mace vith any intention to
t ^
ahide hy them, and tho same technique of propaganda,
coercion and violence was followed in Austria which
had "boon successful in Germany. In tho later stages
when it v/as felt that the plum v/as ripe ond about to fall,
and" when tlic possible intervention of other powers still
existed, a purported repudiation of Austrian radicals v/as
put forth, " not because of disapproval of what they wore
doing, but to oc.mouflagc the program.
^'hilo it is now asserted that an ovorv/hclming
majority of Austricns acccptod and were enraptured by
tho Anschluss, neither Jlitlcr ncr his crew could con
tain themselves to await what they now term was the
inevitable, nor run the hazard of a plebiscite, but
Seyss-Inquart v/as forced on Gchusclmigg and made liinistcr
of the Interior vhcro ho could control the police and
finally an ultimatum was served on the A\istrian govern
ment, and the troops marched in. hut before a German
soldier crossed tho border, armed bands of ITational Soc
ialist SA and SS units under Gorman control and orders
'
and leaders, had taken possession of tho city of Vienna,
seized ths reins of government, and ousted the leaders of
the Austrian state and placed them under guard.
In view of the size of the German army, the dispro
portion in manpower and military resources, no hope of
. succossful resistance existed, Austria fell without a
stvMSQlc, and the Anschluss v/as accomplished. It was
follov;ed "by the proscription, .persecution and interne-
ment in concentration camps of those v/ho had resisted
the Hazi movement, and the policy there pursued was iden
tical with those which had followed the seizure of power
in Germany.
That the invasion wa«3 aggressive and that Hitler
✓
follov/ed a campaign of docoit, threats and coercion, is
hsyond question. Tho Vv'holo story is one of duplicity
and overwhelming force. It was a part of a program do-
clarod to his ovai circlo, and wrs the first stop in the
well-ooncoived and carefully planned oam'-algn of aggres
sion, .Austria first,Czechoslovakia second, and Poland
third, while visions of the further aggresaivo aggrandize
ment wore dangled before tho eyes of the German loaders,
neither those acts nor the invasion by Gorman armed
forces c.an bo said to bo pacific moans or a poa.coful
and orderly process within the meaning of the Preamble
of the Kellogg-Sriand Pact, and violated both its letter
ond spirit.
It must ho borne in mind that the term "invasion''
connotes and implies the use of force. In the instant
cases the force used was military force. In the course
of construction of this definition, v/e certainly may
consider the v'ord "invasion" in its usually accepted
sense, lo may assume that the enacting authorities also
used the term in a like sense. In V/ebstei^s CJnabridged
Dictionary, we find the following definition of invasions
"Invasions 1. Act of invading, esp., a
warlike or hostile entrance into the
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poasGSsions or domains of another, - the
Incursion of an army for conquest or
plunder."
The evidence v/ith respect to both Austria
and Czechoslovakia indicates that the invasions were hostile
and agGrcaslve, An invasion of this character is clearly
such an act ofv;ar as is tantamount to, and maybe treated
as, a declaration of v/ar. It is not reasonable to assume
that an act of '-ar, in the natiire of an invasion, ^ihereby
conquest and plundec are achioved without resistance, is
to bo given more favorable consideration then a similar
invasion, \7hich may h ve mot v/ith some military rosistanc
The fact that the aggressor v/as hero able to so overawe
the invaded countries, does not detract in the slightest
from tho enormity of the aggression, in reality perpetrat
ed. The invader here employed an act of war. This act
of v;ar was an Instrument of national policy. Tribunal V
in Case Ho. 12 (The Hi^^h Command case) in the course of
its judgment said:
"'As a preliminary to that we deem it
necessary to give a brief consideration to
the nature and characteristics of'" or. ib
need not attempt a definition that is all
inclusive and all exclusive. It is sufficient
to say that wae; is the exerting of violence
by one state or politically organized body,
against another. In other words, it is the
imnlomontation of a political policy by moans
o/violcnco. -Vars arc contests by force be
tween political units but the policy that
brings about their initiation is made and
the actual waging of them is done by individ
uals. V/hat we have aeid thus ibr is equally
applicable to a just as to an unjust war, to
the initiation ofan aggressive and, there
fore criminal war, os to the waging of defen
sive and, therefore, legitimate war against
criminal aggression. The^pointv/e stress is
that war activity is the implementation of a
predetermined national policy.
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"Likev/iso, an invasion of one stste "b:/
another Is tho mplementation of the national
policy of the invaciln,^ state '077 force even
thou!7h the invaded'st a-to, due- to fear or a
sense of the futility/ Of resistance in tho
face of superior force, cdopts r policy of
non-resistance and thus prevents the occur-
ronce of any actual combat,"
(Underscoring silpp^liecl)
•o hold that the invasion of Austria v/as ng.^rcssivG
and a crime a gainst peace v:ithin the meanlnr; of Control
Council Lav/ No, 10.
V/e have already quoted Nitlor^s v/ords as to his
plans re^ardin" the Czochoslovcklan state. The objec
tives v;cro fixed but the tactics of accomplishment v/ere
elastic and dopcndcd upon tho necessities and conveniences
of time and circumstance. This v/as no more than the dis
tinction botv/ecn militar"' stratoj^y and tactics. Strategy
is tho over-all plan which docs not vary. Tactics are
the techniques of action which adjust themselves to the
^ *
circumstances of weather, terrain, supply and resistance.
The Nazi plans to destroy the Czech state remained con
stant. But v/here, vhen and how to strike depended upon
circumstances as the^:' arose,.
The evidence establishes beyond all question or
doubt that Germany, under Hitler, never made a promise
v/hlch it intended to keep, that it promised anything and'
everything v/hencver it thought promises would lull sus
picion, end promised peace on tho eve of initlatln£v war.
vhen in 1958 Germany invaded Austria it was in no
danger from that state or its neighbors. Then it h^d
swallov^ed the Austrian Federal State, Germany moved against
-52-
Czechoslovakia, using the question gf Sudeten Germans
as a inere excuse Tor its demands a^'^iunichj it c omplgued
its organisation of and assumed even greater control over
Henlein and his party, v/hich it had secretly organized and
subsidized, and directed him to reject any Czech ej-forts
of composition and compromise, and to constantly increase
his demands.
At hunich it put forth demands for the annexation
of the Sudetenland when theretofore it had not suggested
it. Its Foreign Office had instructed its representatives
to inform Lord Runciman that unless his report regarding
the Sudeten question vas favorable to the German wishes,
dire international I'esults would follov/; after Lunich
it promised and declared that it had no further ideas of
aggression against the remnants of the Czech state v/nen,
at the very moment, those plans were in existence, and
were x'eady to be matured. It fomented, subsidized and
supported the Slovakian movement for Independence in the
face of its assurance of friendship with the Czechs, .hen
Tiso seemed to hesitate, Hitler made it clear that unless
this action vras taken, he would lose interest in the olo-
vaklans, lie summoned the aged and ill Hacha to Berlin and
threatened his country with war and the destruction of its
ancient capital, Prague, by aerial warfare. He started his
armed forces on the march into Bohemia and Loravia before
he had coerced Hacha into submission.
The announcement that its relations with Poland were
excellent and that peace was assured,.came when plans Tor
the invasion of Poland wore already decided upon. It made
MU..
non-aggrosaion pacts, gave assurances to Denmark and
Norway, at a tims v;hen the question of occupying these
countries for the purpose of obtaining bases v;as being
considered. It assured Holland,Belgiutn and Luxenibourg
that it would respect their noutrolity, when it had al
ready planned to violate it, and only awaited a pro
pitious moment so to do.
' VJhen Germany fomentod and subsidized the Hcnloin
Sudoton Ilovemcnt, it knew that Czechoslovakia desired
peace and not war. It used the technique of a gent provo
cateur, both in Czechoslovakia and again in Poland to
create incidents upon v/nioh it could seize as an excuse
for military action.
Hitler's aggression against Russia' as not induced
by foar of : attack, but because Russia had material re
sources for which Hitler hankered. How, at th^t time, any
country could have had the slightest faith in Germany's
v/ord is beyond comprehension,
The record is one of abyssmal duplicity which carried
in its train death, suffering and loss to practically every
people in the world; it brought ruin to Gormany and a worldr
wide distrust in the ability of its people to govern them
selves as a peace-loving and u' cful nation. Because of t his
record the road back is long and arduous and besot v;ith
dij?flculty.
The attempt which had been made to create the fic
tion and fable that the Third Reich acted in self-defense
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and v;ai£ justified in its .? eta tov/ards its neighbors,
has no foundation and is, in fact, c disservice to
the G-ornrn people, "'e believe it is an effort to lay.
the groundwork for a resurgence of the ideologj which
brought untold suffering to the v-or Id and ruin to the
Gerraan nation.
Until the seizure of pov/er, the V/estcrn Uorld,
on the ^holc, looked with s;^i-ipathy and satisfaction on
the efforts of the German people to regain the place in
the family of nations to v/hich it as entitled, and which
\ ^
it had lost. They suspected, even if they did not laiow,
that Germany, from the very day that it signed the Ver
sailles Treaty, had secretly violated its terms as to
disarmament. But vhile suspicion of Germany's good faith
existed in some circles, a strong hope and faith prevailed
that the German nation would achieve a free and prosperous
society.
It VIas th^. ilazi regime and its ready acceptance by
the Gorman people which brought the world to arms in de
fense against on ideology and a dictator whose programs
and aims knew no bounds,
/ifter having rcliod upon Germany's pledge 4it li-unich,
and found it worthless, having observed the incr^.asing
demands upon and its intransigence towards Poland, it is
not surprising that Franco and Fngland found it necessary
to enter into a trcat^T- of aasistanco v/ith Poland, and
there is neither fact nor substance to the contontion that
that treaty gave Poland a blank check, G-crraany v/as so in
formed by Prnnce and Ungland> as v/ero the Polos,
V
ITo juatifIcat-ion can, or has boon offered, for the
Invasion of Denmark, other then the pseudo one of mili
tary necessity. The Danes had maintained their neutral
ity and had Divcn no offense to Germany. It was helpless
and resistance hopeloss, as the gallant, but futile re
sistance of the PalacG Guards jndicctcd. But as v/o shall
hofoaftcr discuss, military necessity is never available
to an aggressor aa a defense for invading the rights of a
neutral.
Korways The defense insists that the invasion of Iiorv;ay
Y/as justified because of French end British plans to land
expeditionary forces there, in -violation of Hpn-egian neu
trality, and therefore, Germany acted in s ..If-dcfenso.
may repeat the statement that, having initiated aggressive
wars, v;hidi brought* ?dngland and rrancc to the aid of the
Polos, Germany forfeited the right to claim self-dofcnao,
but there arc other and cogent facts which make the dcfonsc
unavailable.
Long before the discovery of alleged British and
French plans, and before any such plans existed, the
Third Belch commenced t.o support an - , subs idizo 'Quisling
and his movement for t ho purpose of gaining control of the
ITorwogian 'iovcrnmcnt and therefore, of Norr'a^-. It made no
✓ ♦
inquiry whether rlorv/ay could, or would, protect its neu
trality against Britain and France, and the German official
documents disclose that it avoided such an approach and
kept its plans accrob because of the fear that the other
neutral nowrors would intervene end institute discussions
directed toward maintaining Lorwcgi':^n neutrality ^and pre-
uitlng that country from becoming a theatre ofwar.von
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Finally the desiralDility of o"bt2ining air and
other has OS in Norway v/as a motivating factor for
the invasion and this was pointed out iDy Raedcr and
Doenitz as early as o Octohcr 1939#
"/e hold thot the invasion of .Norway was aggressive,
that the warwhlch Oermany initiated and waged there vra's
without lawful justification or excuse, and is a crime
under international law and Control Council Law No# 10#
Luxembourg; No justification or excuse is offered regard
ing the invasion of Luxembourg other than military conven
ience. No claim is made that Luxembourg had in any way
violated its neutrality. In fact, it had not. The Gorman
invasion v/as aggressive, v/ithout^ legal justification or
excuse.
Belgium and the Netherlands; That both of these nations
v/ere pathetically eager to avoid being drawn into the hdlo-
caust is established beyond doubt. That they had every
reason to be distrustful of Germany's word is equally clear.
The testimony offered by the defense discloses that '/when
I
the Third Reich assured "liio Low Countries that it Intended
to and would observe its treaty obligations, and had no
hostile intentions, tho intention to invade had already
been determined upon and was onlg" awaiting a favorable
moment.
An attempt has been made to assert that the invasion
of Belgium was justified because of conversations between the
French and Belgian Military Staffs. The Belgian government
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\had "been apprchcnsivo for riany months that Germany
v'ould use its territory as a moans to attack tho French
flank. German propcrations to invade Belsiiim had "been
matured lon'3 sinco, and were hardly a secret. Bolsium
was properly concerned regarding her defense and possible
aid if she V/ere invaded, and her conversations with the
French and English were addressed to this alone. Hitler's
I
attack was without justification or excuse, and consti
tuted a crime a gainst peace. As to Holland, there is
even less ground for justification and excuse.
* ✓
Yugoslavia and Greeces Germany's Axis partner, Italy,
initiated an aggressive attack against Greece v/h'ich the
defense docs not attempt to justify, but assorts that this
v/as undertaken without previous consultations or a groement
vdth Hitler. This apjxars to bo true. But Germany had
been advised by its representativos in Rome of the immi
nence of the attack and its Foreign Office knevr of Greek
apprehensions regarding tho sane, and It intentionally
displayed alleged ignorance and rciused to take any action
to prevent it. Tho German excuse for the attack on Greece
is that England had landed certain troop elements in aid
of Froece*s defense against Italy and that as a matter of
self-defense Germany v;as compelled to intervene, but an
aggressor may not loose the dogs of war and thereafter
nlecd self-defense.
The only Justification offered for the German inva^i-
Sim of Yugoslavia is the coup d'«8tat v;hich oyerthrev/ the
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govcrnrnent which had signed the anti-Cor.iintern Pact, and
the fear that Yugoslavia v'ould remain neutral only until
such time as it night join the ranks of G-ermany^a enemies.
The unquestioned fact is that every country, and par
ticularly those v,h ich lay along or near German boundaries,
v/as fully av.'aro that German actions in Austria , Czechoslo
vakia and Poland wore a ggrcsslvo and unjustified, and that
in attacking and invading, Hitler had broken not only the
provisions of the '^ello.gg-kriand Pact, but the pledges
which he had given to those countries; each fully dis- ,
approved of Germsny^s rction and the question which lay
in their minds was v'hcrc t'lc next blovr v-ould fall. To
thinl- there is no doubt whstsccvcr thet every countrg' in
Europe, except its Axis partners, hoped for Gorman defeat
as the one insurance for its ov.n cafoty, but such hopes
cannot Justify the German action against them. •
The claim of solf-dcfcnsc is without merit. That
doctrine is never available either to individuals or na
tions, who are aggressors. The robber or the murderer
crnnot claim self-defense in attacking the police to avoid
arrest or diose who, he fear's, disapprove of his criminal
conduct and hope that lie will be apprehended and brought to
JusticG.
The Invasion of Austria, the invasion of Bohemia
and horavia, and the attack on Poland wer^ in violation
f
of international law and in each case, by resorting to
armed force, Germany violated tho Hellogg-Brirnd Pact.
It thereby became an international outlaw and cvorg" peaceable
nation had the right to opposo it vdthout itself becoming
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an aggressor, to help the attacked and join with those
who ha.d provlously come to the aid of the victim. The
doctrine of self-defense and military necessity was
never availahle to Germany as a matter of international
law, in viov; of its prior violations of that law.
United States of Americas That the United States abandoned
a neutral attitude toward Germany long before Germany de
clared war is v/ithout qusetion. It hopdd for Germany*a _
defeat,gave aid and support to Great Britain, and to the
governments of the countries which Germany had overrun.
4 Its- entire course of conduct for over a year before 11
December 1911, was v/holly Inconsistent with neutrality
and that it had no intention of permitting Germany^s vic
tory, even though this led to hostilities, became increas
ingly apparent. However, in so doing, the United States did
^ not become an aggressor; it'•'as acting within its inter
national rights in hampering and hindering, v;ith the
intention of insuring the clefeg-t of the nation vhich had
v/rongfully, without excuse and in violation of its treaties
and obligations, embarked on a coldly calculated program
of aggression and war. But such intent, purpose and action
does not remove the aggressive character of the German
declaration ofv.'ar of 11 December 1941.
A nation which engages in aggressive war invites
the other nations of the v:orld to take measures, includ
ing force, to halt the invasion and to punish the aggressor,
and if by reason thereof the aggressor declares war on a
third nation, the original aggression carries over and gives
the character of aggression to the second and succeeding wars.
9
i
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We hold that the invasions and v/ars described in
paragraph tv/o of the Indictment a gainst Austria., Czecho
slovakia, Poland, the United Kingdom and prance, Denmark
and ITorv/ay, Belgium, the ITetherlands and Luxembourg,
Yugoslavia and Ureece, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, and the United States of America v:ere unlaw
ful and aggressive, violated international law, and were
crimes within the definition of the London Charter and
Control Council Law Uo, 10,
Our task is to determine which, if any, of the
defendants, knowing there -as an intent to so initiate
and wage aggressive war, consciously participated in
either plans, preparations, initiations of those wars,
or so iQiovring, participated or aided in carrying them
on. Obviously, no man may be condemned for fighting in
what he believes is the defense of his native land, even
though his belief be mistaken, for can he be ejqsected
to undertake an independent investigation to determine
whether or not the cause for which he fights is the re
sult of an aggressive act of his ov.ti government. One
can be guilty only v/liere Imowledge of aggression in fact
exists, and it is not sufficient that he have suspicions
that the is aggressive.
Any othe."* test of guilt v^ould involve a standard
of conduct both impracticable and unjust.
Criminal Responsibility? Article II, Section 2 of Control
Council Law No, 10, provides that?
"Any person rrithout regard to" nati onality
or the capacity in v/hich he s ctecl, ia deemed to •
have comraittsd a crime c s defined in Paragraph
1 of this Article if he was (a) a principal, or
(b) v/as an accessory to the commission of'any
such crime or ordered or abetted the same, or .
(c) took a consenting part therein •
Therofore, all those who v/ere either principals or
accessories before or after the fact, are criminally respon-
siblc,although the degree of criminal responsibility may
vary in accordance \,'ith the nature of his acts.
Under the provisions of Section 4, Article II,
"The I'act that any person acted pursuant
to the order of his government or of a'superior
does not free him from responsibility for a
crime, but maybe considered in mitigation."
In the realm of tho ordinary criminal lav/, one v/ho
conceals the fact that a crime lias boen committed or gives
falso testimony as to the facts for the purpose of giving
some advantage to the perpetrator, not on account of fear
but for the saliG of an advantage to the accused, is an
accessory after the fact. Under English criminal law, one
v/ho destroys or suppresses evidence of a crime or manufac
tures evidonco tending to ;^rOTre the felon's innocence,
is like?;ise an accessorg?- after the fact, (14 Amer, Juris,
Criminal Law, Para. lOo, 104.)
Applying these principle a to international criminal
V
law, we hold that one, who is under duty to speak tho
truth, and who conceals the fact that a crime has been
committed, or destroys or supprossos evidence regarding
it, or who manufactures evidonco tending ro prove his
government's innocence, is an accessory within the moaning
of gention 2, Article II, of Control Council Law Uo. 10,
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It must be apparent to everyone that the many
cliversej elaborate and complex J?azi programs of aggres
sion and exploitation '.vere not self-executing, but their
success v;as dependent, in a large measure, upon the devo
tion and skill of men holding positions of authority in
the various departmcnta of the Keich government charged
\7ith the a dministration or oxocution of such programs.
In discussing v/hethcr or not the Koich Cabinet
was a criminal organisation v/ithin the meaning of the
London Charter, the International liixitary Tribijinsl
said I
"The Tribunal is of the opinion that no
declaration of criminality should bo trede
v/ith respect to tb.o .Roich Cabinet for two
reasons;
"(1) Because it is not shown that
after 1937 it over really acted as a group
or organization;
"(2) Because the group of persons
here charged is so small that members could
bo conveniently tried in proper cases v/ithout
resort to a declaration that the CEbinot of
which they wore members v-as criminal . . .
"it v/ill bo remembered that Y/hen Hitler
disclosed his aims of criminal aggression
at the Hossbaoh Conference, the disclosure '
v/as not made before the Cabinet, and that the
Cabinet was not consulted '-ith regard to it,
but, on the contrary, it was made secretly to
a small group upon whom Hitler would necessarily
rely in carrying on the 'ar . . .
"it does appear, however, that various
lav;s authorizing acts which "•ore criminal under
the Charter v/ero circulated among the members
of the Reich Cabinet and issued under its
authority, signed by the members v.^hose depart-
ment3"v7ere concernod." .
(Vol. 1, HIT, pp 275-276)
—
f-.
The principles there stpted ere equally eppllcpble
to the defendp'nts here who -were member? of the Cabinet
end to those defendants who occupied popitions of respcn-
sibility end power in the vprious ministries,
concur in end shell ooply the following principles
laid down by the Internationpl Nilitery Tribunal:
"A plen in the execution of which a
number of persons participate is still a plan,
even though conceived by only one cf them;
and those who execute the plan do not avoid
responsibility by showing that they acted
under the direction of the man who conceived
it. Hitler could not make aggressive war by
himself. Re had to h=^ve the cooperation of
statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and
t businessmen, ''hen they, vfith knowledge of
i his aims, gave him their cooperation, they
made themselves parties to the pl-'^n he h^d
initiated. They are not to be deemed inno
cent becf^use Hitler m^^de use of them, if they
knev; V'/hat they vore doing. That they were
asaigned to their tasks by « dictator does
not absolve them from res'^onsibility for
their acts. The relation of leader and
follower does not "nreclude responsibility
here any more than it d^-ea in the comparable
J tyranny of organized domestic crime,"
(Vol I, BT, p ?26.)
i v-fhile we hold that knowledge that Hitler's wars and
I invasions were aggressive is an essential element of guilt
under C'^unt One of the Indictment, a very different situa
tion arises viith resoeot to Counts Three, Five, Six, and
Seven, vihich deal ^"Ith w.px- crimes and crimes agoinpt humanity.
Ke who knowingly joined or implemented, aided or abetted
in their commission ac. npincipal or accessory, cannot be
heard to say that he did not know the acts in question
\ were criminal. Measures which result in murder, ill-
treatment, enslavem.ent and other inhumane acts oerpetrated
- U '
on pri'^onerP of vjpt, deport^^^tion, eyterminption, en?lpve-
ment, end nersecution on political, reciel end religious
grounds, end plunder ®nd spolietion of -nublic end privete
property, ere acts v-hich shook the conscience of every
decent man. These «re criminal per se.
We heve considered the cl'='ims mede by certain of
the defendants that they carried on certain activities
because of coercion and duress., and that therefore they
were forced to act as they did, ^^nd could not resign or
otherwise avoid compliance with the criminal program.
It may be true that they could not have continued to
hold office if they did not so comply, or that offers
of resign^'tion v;ere not accerted , but j=s the defendant
admits, there were other w^ys av^il^ble
to them by which they could have been relieved from
continuing in their course. I'^one of their superiors
v.?ould have continued them in office had it constantly
appeared that they disa-nproved of or objected to the
commission of these criminal programs, and therefore
displayed ^ lack of cooperation. The fact is, that for
varying reasons, each said, as little aa he could, and
when he e^^pressed dissent, did so in words which were
OF soft and Innocuous as he could find,
We find that none of the defendants acted under
coercion or duress.
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WSI73AECKER
The dofendant ERKST VON VJEIZSAEGKER entered the
Foreign Office In 1920 o.nd after serving in various
^capacities there and abroad was appointed Ministerial
Director of the Political Division in 1937, and State
Secret..j?y in April 1938j serving in that cape.city until
the spring of 1943, v/hen he was appointed German Ambassador
to the Vatican^
As State Secretary he was second only to the Foreign
Minisoer, Hiobt^ntrop. All divisions of the Foreign Office
wcro subordinate to him. His relations to Hihbcntrop were
never close, and gradually detorioratod. Through him and
his offiop all the activities of the Foreign Office woro_
channeled, cand all divisions wore found to rocort to him,
and in theory and generally in practice received instruc
tions from him. As his relations with Ribbentrop cooled',
occasions arose when the latter gave ai rnr.-h ^
: to - , cct; Instructions
to ministers and ambacsadors abroad, i v.
1 ^some instances
to divisions of the Foreign Office
1 ' ^ ^iiicc, without,first consultingor informing him, but generally that was not the case. "
Although the .icfondant IffilZSAECER was not present
at the conforoAcos whore Hitler announced his plans of
aggression, he became familiar with them from reliable
sour^cos. i.e., Ribbentrop, Cauai^is, loading denor^is of
the -Jchrmacht and others, who furnished him wit,
. accurateinformation, Ho was neither dooolvod nor ml^
misled concerningthe prograjn, although in certain Instances hn
boon fully advised of the actually echeduloa
Ho maJios no question about this. That '
world and to his chief, the Foreign rml
minister, ho Wore the
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ffacG of a X'Tilling and earnest collabo ator, or at least
a consenting one, in many instances, ho lilicwlse concedes.
The docLiraents v/hich he signed or initialled, the confer
ences which he had with foreign diplomats, the directions
which he gave to his subordinates, and to the G-orman
diplomatic missions abroad^are more than sufficient,
unless othervrise explained, not only to warra,nt but to
compel a judgment of guilty.
* His defense is that, although appo^ing to
1 collaborate, ho was continuoasly engaged in ondoavoring
to sabotage it and Wc>s an active member of the resistance
«. movement; that he never sympathized with or ap'orovcd of
the Party movement or of tho Hitler pro'^ram nfl
« '• y ana that
when it became clear to him tlmat the f m-o-i o.>.
xuxoign policy of
Hitler and Ribbentrop entailed the danger of war and
that when he became informed that Hitlpv^
intended to
aggressive wars and invasions as a meanQ 1-,^cuia to carry out
his political plans, he became active in plots and plaJ1 to remove him from pox-Jer by means of a Putsch t b
engineered and executed by those chiefs n-p -i-uof the Army who
held the same convictions as did he. inat the men thus
involved included, among others, General q 1= ,
cij.b aeck and
- Haider, Admiral Canaris, Colonel Ostor and oth
he was convinced that the policies of
' -tiitlor and Ribbcntro-o
entailed, as they did in fact, dCcath riio ^
' aster andh destruction to the German people anci the
r. , ' * Of tilsFatherland., and that his loyalty to both
to usothoso fflettiods for the salvation of t.
felt dear. he
use
ins
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nThe defense tho.t things nro not vrhnt they seem,
and thr.t one gave lip service but iras secretly engaged
in rendering even this service ineffective; that, in
saying "Yes", one meant is a defense readily
available to the most guilty, and is not novel, either
here or in other jurisdictions. Such a defense must be
regarded \;ith suspicion and accepted with caution, and
then only when fully corroborated. The exceeding caution
observed by the defendant on cross-cxojnination and his
claims of lack, of recollection of events of importance,
which, by no stretch of the imagination could be deemed
routine, his insistence that he be confronted with docu
ments before testifying about such incidents, were not
calculated to create an impression of frankness and candor.
His failure to suggest at his interrogations that ho was a
member of tho resistance movement and thoi-oforo was opposed
to aggrossion and to tho Nazi Hogime when it must have
ooouri-od to him, as it would to any innocent man', that
cuoh a statement particularly if it was oorroboratad',
Hould ha.vo disarmed those who might otherwise bo in Lubt
of his guilt, is difficult to understand.
However, those instances -lono
- "no ao not justify
USin casting_aside tho dofonso. It must b
considered, oven though this oonsidor-tiG carefully
on DC accompanied
with caution and even suspicion a m
man is presumed to-
intend the natural consequences of hio
, , ^ deliberate
racts, out this presumption foils if i-u.
n. h .u . u ^ <=vidonce establishes that tho contrary is true
.-48-
V!e recognize th«t> in the Third Reich, conditions
vhich surround individuals in e free end democratic
society, did not exist and that he v-ho clotted against
the dictator could not vaesr his heart ucon his sleeve
nor leave a trfiil "which could be readily followed, '7e
therefore rroceed to analyze the defendant's claims,
check them against his acts, to evaluate the testimony
offered u-on his behalf, in the hope, thereby, to unravel
the tangled skein and ascertain the truth,
'He reject the claim th^t good intentiona render
innocent that which is otherwise criminal, pn.6 which
asserts that one may with impunity commit-
t>fcrious crimes,
because he hones thereby to prevent others x.oiitr. , or that general
benevolence toward individuelg is a cloak or justificstion
for n^rticicPtion in crimes against the unknown many,
"Planning, Preparing, initiatine nr. .
' - • ' waging aggressive
war, with its attendant horrors, suffer-irr,> ^J-xering and loss, is s
crime which stands at the pinnacle of
^iiminaiity. por it
there is no justification or excuse,
we shall deal with the charges of aggresrlve
invasions and wars in the order set fnrf-K 4
^orth in the Indictment.
Austri'^, The prosecution relies u*^on ^
following
evidence:
(1) That^-fSIZSATUC'^ R was Chief of
ox the aermen
Delegation to the mired oommiapj^Qj^
appointed or the besis! of
''"9 German-
Austrian Agreement of n tmt
1936.
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(2) Thpt the aefendnnt mpintPlned oontRct
with the Foreign Office, horing thereby to
eliminate differencea of opinion and that
as Chief of the Political
Division, carried the resr-onsibiiity for
coordination of Foreign Offioe diplomatic
activities vjith the general plans of
aggression,
(3) That on severe! occasions, talked
^ith ".rEIZ.oABCrv.R, his .ubordlnate Altenburg
and von Neurath - that these conferences, in
particular, cloaked a clandestine meeting
between members of the aermen Delegation and
leaders of the ^a,ty in Austria, particularly
Cnptj^in Leonold,
<.) section receded
letter stating that Seyss-m.uart .ould not
undertake any obligations relative to
Austrian status without the nrevinn
contactend agreement .ith Hitler and the aerman
Foreign Office.
(5) That referent ,
t •^•'-^onburff
tne ..n
Which it w«s p<^id: '
"The nrim'^rv reoiHr.,-
spitisfRctory result of a
pogress shouia be the ni! ibetween the men emrowered f °°°Peration
carry on negotiationrand Reic^o
Of the movement in Ancfli- ^xponenfo
prevent Schuschnigg orderPeich agalnst the^Sove::„;^^ping
and vice versa." In Austria
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(6) That the Foreign Office, from October 1937,
defrayed orx-h^lf of the monthly propagendp.
exT^enae? incurred by l^^ergle, of the
in Auetria.
(7) That •"JEIZ.*^.AFC'''ER yp-p pv?are, in "February 1938,
that large quantities of National Socialist
propaganda material was being ship->ed illegally
into Austria from Germany.
(e) I'.HIZ'^ AECI-a^E knew of von Neur^th's
diplometio aurtific=tion for the invasion of
Austrle Which wes iesued on or ^bout 1? K«rch
1938.
(9) Thet '^ reIZSAECI^R wrote a preface to the Foreign
Office Year Book for 1938, in which he stated
thet thPt ye=<r would =lw=ys hove e speciei renk
in German history as the end of i-h^
the reunion
vdth AustriP end thet it was good t ^
to remember
that in nolitics nothing is accomplished by
mere chance. n
These claims, however, do not estahiic^h
-ti guilt, The
offense is the Planning, nrenaration inie-
uitiation of
pggresrive invasions. That such an inv«c--ir.^
Place asthe result of planning, etc., is perfectiv
i-vio a f but unlessthe defendant Participated in them, he committ
dnder international l^w, and certainly not th
charged.
In the absence of treaty oblieoti
^ One mav ancourage political movements in another state
the leadera of auch movementa and give pJ
financial or
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no offense
® one here
rother Fupport, ^11 for the purpoee of strengthening the
movement, vJhich hes en ^nne-x-ption es itp ultimate purpose
without violating international lav. it is only when
these things are done with knowledge that they ^re a part
of a scheme to use force and to be followed, if necessary,
by aggressive war or invasion that an offense cognizable
by this Tribunal comes into being. There is no evidence
that ^.^rKIZSi^ECTTSR, at the time, knew that Hitler intended
to invade ,Austrif^. think it may be fairly said that
until the latter stages of the incident, Hitler felt that
his objectives could be att^^-ined by means other th^n
invasion by the German armed forces; his own statements
clearly show that if he could not do so he fully
intended to use force. If, however, this was not known
to T'JEIZ.SAECFEr at the time he acted, he committed no
offense irrespective of how one may view the morality of
the remainder of the program. This Tribunal has juris
diction over certain specified crimes, and has none over
questions of morality not involved in those offenses.
The evidence does not establish
guilt in connection with the invasion of Austria
The Sudetenland - Munich. While tha
pursued by
Hitler and Ribbentrop in the months beforp .
^ ^-nd during the
Munich conference were those of the thrpot-^...l^ening bully pna
highwayman, they were effective, and Ene-iav,^ Pnd France,
in an ?^ttempt to avoid a general European
» supinely
submitted. The "s-act was signed and P^pr^v,
Czechoslovakia was
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left helpless end therefore eoquiesced in the resultant
annexation of the Sudetenland. There no invasion and
no war, Germany's possession of the Sudetenl^nd was the
result of an international agreement. That Hitler had
no intention to abide by it and th^^t his assurances to
"England, France and Czechoslovaicia. that this was the end
of his territorial aims were false, there can be no doubt,
This is established by his own words at the conference of
5 November 1937, recorded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hossbach,
and reiterated at the meeting of 23 November 1939, gut
vrgizPAFGirEP was not present at either of these conferences
and there is no evidence that he was nresently informed
of the plans ^^nnounced by Hitler at the first of these
meetings.
That he continuously discouraged Hibbentrop's
nenchant for aggressive war, endeavored to dissuade him
from embarking on a campaign which might involve aggressive
wj^r, is shown from the memorandum which he submitted on
21 cTuly 1938 and again on 19 August of that year.
In the first, in answer to Pibbentrop'a boast that
if necessary, Germany would allow a major war with the
Western -Powers to break out and ^^•ould win it, and that
the French could be decisively crushed in a ma Int.jor engage
ment with Germany, that Germany was e'Quipped w-i fv,
•i. ^ v-.iph enough
raw materials and that Goering was directing aircraft
instruction in such a. way that Germany v/as superior t
any enemy, WEIZSAECFER said:
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^ th^t to outsiders one must
telK in such e manner as to convince them.
I said that even vihen it was our task to fool
foreign countries, it vas our duty not to fool
ourselves, I did not believe th®t we should
win this war. It was a basic truth that one
could.only conquer a country if one eitheroccupied It or starved it S&t. To want tS do
this with airplanes was a Utopian dream; so
I did not understand how we could win the war,
nor did I believe in our powers of endurance."
In a memorandum of 13 August 1938, Ribbentrop ex
plained to 'ffllZSAECKER that Hitler was firmly resolved to
settle the Czech affair by force of arms and had said that
on account of flying conditiors the middle of October was
the latest possible date, that the other powers would
definitely do nothing about it and, if they did, Germany
would take them on as well and win. v.JsiTSAECirER then
records his views as follov/s:
V opposed this whole theory andobserved that we should have to awaitdevelopments until the English lost interest inthe Czech mnter end would tolerete our eotLn
before vre could tackle the affair without undna
risk. Eibbentroa wanted to '.-ut thrquestiofol
responsibility in such a way that T was
responsible to him, he only to the Fuehrer and
the Fuehrer alone to the German nation, whereas
I maintained that one's way of thlnnh ™nereasbe based on such an ideology in order to f
it out to the best adv^nt^ge PihKa +•that the Fuehrer had not yit'been w^o ®that his most difficult dLis^^^^ anrf^t'''^
behalf of the Ehineland were aireaa^ hati
and one must believe in his genius L h«
Ribbentrop, did, from long years of avnoi-
If I had not yet come to the noln? o?
faith in this matter ... hrurSed r.2 P'''?
to do so. He said X would certain!vit later, if I did not do so! and 1? thfs®!.,
were later to speak against me."
At the end of August 1938, VraiZ '^AHCFSi prepared a
"strictly secret" report in which he said:
"The next few weeks win
the Czeohoslovaklan question from a ? growth of
• into a Suronean one. The great f,,.. crisisgreat European powers
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will then show their Plignment more cleprly in
militpry snheres,tooon there v?on't be «^ny more room for doubt th»t
^nn?rt. ot Czechoslov^kiP, Germanyv;ould be fpced with the ''•'^estern "^owers ps
pifcu«tion, the leadinglight, of German policy have got to review their
plans quickly. If they should fail to do so. a
European war would develOD after a short warmina-
wou?d^^o'^ following upon the German. Such a war
SS ?f "• German capitula-t Bi Theonaiition of western Fov;ers can if
cneyso desire, decide the war without a ireat
blockading Germany.
" defeat would mean for
.Aooir Hitler's reconstruction progrem."
^ on 1 Sentember 1938 Kordt, in London, reported to
^^^JEIZSAEC^rEP:
t.
"In the course of yesterdey thr •RrTt-iQHGovernment received information occordin^^J^
which the Fuehrer intends to solve the rf^=.nS
questions by force. These items of inrnr^ol-*
ohiefly^originate from Churchill,^-nsUtPr^ '^'
^nd. Christie. In yesterday's tplk with
the necessityfor timely end energetic pction on the nart of
the British Government if they still wanted ?n
prevent the outbresk of wer
^ "In the Foreign Office all non-German
visitors are given to understand quite onenlv
that Britain would not yield pgpin thio
PS the other time in the case of it^iv' *
oolicy of the year 1935 had nreduced the mo^f
sevep consequences °nd Britain had to'maWo
UT) Its mind to confront the Germans wMth
categorical 'stop' in conjunction vith ^ht
allies, if need be by force of arms "
On 16 September 1938, von Hassel made i-h^ ^ .
•^ne following
entry in his diary:
"Friday, September the Sixteenth;'
"... TfEIZSAHCKFR told me today that
apparently Chamberlain did not make it
sufficiently clear that England would en
war if Germany used force."
"7e select these documents out of mpnrr v
teoRuse they
are contemnorpneous with the events undar ^
examination.
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•von H^psel was p member of the resistance group end was
executed by the F^zi regime in connection with the 20 0"uly
-1944'plot. The genuineness of his diary is not questioned.
This, with'V?ilIZS^ECF^R'S own testimony, demonstrates .
not only that he was not engaged in planning or preparing
an aggressive war, but th^t he was averse to it and that
he expressed no thought th'^'t, in the long run, it would'
i
be successful but, on the contrary, that it would involve
disaster to Germany,
^ "^e pass now from the views which he expressed to his
t
friend and collaborator, von Hassel and to his chief,
Bibbentrop, to the efforts allegedly put forth to advise
the French f^nd English of Hitler's plans and the suggestions
y;hich he made for their frustration, /igainst we do not rely
UT^on what his associates now say he thought and did, but
upon what officials^ of foreign governments depose were his
views and acts,
• lord Halifax, who was British Foreign secretary
^ from 1938 to 1940, deposed that although he never had any
official contact with the defendant, he was frequently
reported, by edviPors f-nd the British hmbessedor
St B,erlin, es being e convinced op-^onent of Nr,zi iaenis
and policy, ^nd he used his official position in the
Foreign Office to hinder, as far as lay ^
execution of Ribbentrop's policies,
lord Halifax gave his second affidavit in which
he denoses that Theodore Fordt's letter of 29
-^nd hlp reply of 9 August 1947 stpte the facts These
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letters on their fece relete to the de-Nezificption pro
ceeding!^ of BriohFordt, v'ho wp.s e witness before this
Tribunel. Theo Fordt i^vrote:
•TTou will remember that the information I
gpve you pnd sir Pobert Vansittert on Hitler's
plans and moves in these terrible years of
crisis came all from my brother Brich, who
held a key position in the op""osition group.
T'^ y brother hanpened to be at that time in the
Foreign Office in Berlin. His loyalty did not
belong to this Fazi regime but to the German
people and to the idea of European peace and
international decency, l/ray i recall that I
informed you on September 5th^l938 of the
impending attack on Czechoslovakia. In 1938
and 1939 I was in close (sometimes daily)
contact with the Chief Diplomatic i\dvisor to
H.F, Government, Sir Robert Vansittart. My
brother c^me several times personally to
"London, notwithstanding the obvious risks
for his safety, in order to inform Sir Robert
personally of the impending danger on the
international horizon. Sir Robert assured
me that he would pass this information to you
at once, e.g., of Hitler's plans to come to
an agreement with the Soviet Union, the
negotiations between Hitler and Mussolini
for an alliance and the advice from the German
opposition to put pressure on Mussolini in
order to refrain his partner from the pursunnn^
of his bellicose policy." ^ u^nce
Lord reply oonta.lne the following statements:
"Of course I remember very well the
information that came to me through Lord
Yansittart in these days before the war and
that he said reached him from your brother
You will no doubt have been in coramunicatior
with Lord Yansittart direct..
"I cannot doubt that in so acting vonr.
brother took very great risks and in so dnfr
gave very practical evidence of his active
opposition to the criminal policy of Hitler "
The Bishop of Chichester deposes as follows*
"Information came to us in the Uhited
Fingdom that the State Secretary yok
FEIZSAEOT'^ was opposed to Hitler and PIkk
and the Nazi policies and was using his
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offioipl position to avoid war. AS this informa
tion iwent to our Secretary of Stfete for Foreign
.Affairs, Lord Felifax, it was certainly known *
to the Undersecretary of State, Sir Hobert
Vensittert. Active stecs were taken by, not
only the brothers rordt, but by the state
Secretary, VOU "rSIZSAFCrUE, contrary to Hitler^s
and Bibbcntrop's policies. Thus through Bishop
Berggrav of O^lo a proposal for neace was sent
to Germany, with the khoi^ledge of the British
Foreign Office. Church representatives In
Germany refused even to accent this proposal.
Bishop Berggrav then took it to VON 'IfUSSAECICFR,
who not only accepted it for use as a possible
means of peace talks, but also encouraged our
efforts, all at great risk to himself. These
facts were reported to the Foreign office of
the United Kingdom. Further,, VON V/FIZSAEGKFR
also cooperated with Bishop Berggrav in
endeavoring to have a representative of Great
Britain m.eet with a representative of Germany
to initiate peace talks. These facts were also
reported to the Foreign Office of the United
Kingdom, They demonstrate opposition by VON
'•."EIZS-AECKER to the policies of Hitler and
Hibbentrop and, with other information comine
to us in England, show he was not *the ^hief
executant of Eibbentrop*s policy* as Lord
Vansittart states,...,
. In conclusion, my information from
private and official sources is that VON
v.TlIZSAECKER was opposed to Hitler and Ribbentron
was genuinely opposed to war, did all he could
to prevent war, and used his office for this
purpose and to bring about peace once' ho«tnifi^.c,
commenced. I have a special interest in'the
German o^poPltion to Hitler, hRving been oloPelv
conneoted the op-onentP to Hitler vho were
ective in the Germen church conflict from
onwerae, "nfi in nprticuler I was visited htf
representative of the opposition (^astor pLe • v,
Bonhoeffer) who cnme over from RerT-in ? Dietrich
in the summer of 1942 when I -^n §4-
on that occasion -astor Bonhoeffer broS"^'^^
secret information about the plot
Hitler, for oo.mmunication to the
ment, and told me the names of nanv of
leaders including Goerdeier and Beck- ?
told me of members of the op-'ositinn% ^
Foreign Office. I Passed this informaMnn
in personal interviews with Fr Anthr^,n -2
and Ambassador V/inant of the uAited States!"
• 58 -
The prosecution did not demand e Production of
»ny of these witnesses for cross-rexaminstion, nor did
it file interrogatories to be used in lieu of their
personal a-ppearanoe before the Tribunal. The affiants
are rcen of unquestioned probity, who were in a position
to know the efforts made by the foreign Office opoosi-
^ tion to block and frustrate the plans of Hitler and Pib-
bentrop for aggressive war. There can be no question
whatever that both the Kordts were confidants and mes-
^ sengers of von vrRIS^AECFER.
There arc other affidavits, frotc men prominent
* in the Britsh and American diplomatic service, which
likewise tend to corroborate the testimony of both
Erich and Theo Fordt,
''>re ACQUIT the defendant '•'ffiI2^AEGI'EI? under Count
One with respect to the Sudetenland.
Bohemia and Moravia: "^he invasion and forcible incor
poration of Bohemia and T/oravia as a ""Protectorate into
the "Greater German Belch", and the intrigues by which
Slovakia was induced fTd compelled to declare its inde
pendence were not originated by the defendant ""^/EIZBAECFER,
Nor do we believe that he looked upon the project with
favor. However, this attitude does not constitute a
defense if, notwithstanding his inner disapproval, he
became a party, or aided or abetted or took a consenting
Part therein. He was connected with it, and thir
small way. Most, if not all, the conversations he had
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with the French, BritlFh end It^-lisn diplomet? "were
conducted by YJEIZSABCICSR in PCOord?nce with the custom
" . : of the Foreign Office- We shall advert to them
hereinafter, but before disoussing them, we shall con
sider the evidence offered by the defense.
The defendant testifies that he was op:osed to
the invasion and in an attempt to prevent it, he directed
Hencke of the German Legation in ^rague to prepare a
report which yfould demonstrate the willingness of the
Czech government to comply with the German wishes and to
adjust the -nolicy and legislation to German demands.
This Fencke confirms, "^nd on £8 December 1958 rendered
a report,
Fov-ever, it i^ a janus'faced affair, yVhile on the
one hand it delineates the attitude of the Czech govern
ment as being cooperative, on the other, it erpresses
distrust of some of its members and states that among
the intelligentsia and many officials there existed a
I
feeling that the then state of affairs wes but transitory
and tbey hoped for days of revenge^ that it was not
nosaible to judge whether the majority were for or against
falling into line with Germany; that the preceding few
weeks had led to a stiffening of the general attitude,
p-g ptates that the former Allies of Czechoslovakia, France
and "Russia, had been uninteresting so far as foreign
nolicy •'/^as concerned, and that during the deoirlve crisis
in the nation, the French ?^hov^ed that they w/ere not in any
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position to help Czechoslovakia; that relations with
England vJere cool and that although, according to the
orinion of the governrrent, Britain would never help
nor harm their country, they did not wish to sever
relations with her comnletely. Hencke further sooke
of the "recent improvement" of relations between the
Czechs and Slovakia due to the visit of Hacha to Slo
vakia, and that the Slovskian Ministei» President, Tiso,
had once again spoken of strengthening the bonds of
"blood brotherhood", which had become very weak, and that
the Slovakian copulation gave a remarkably favorable recep
tion to Hacha during his viFit; that in Czechoslovakia the
enactment of the snti-Jewish and other legislation, follow^
ing the German pattern, had aroused'hostile feelings against
Bran who had proposed and had them enacted.
Pe do not consider that this report in any way tended
to help the situation or that it would do other than en
courage any designs wihich Hitler may have had against the
crippled Czech state. One does not cnlm a dictator who
desires to cru^h a weaker state by pointing out the weak
nesses of a well-intentioned government; the hostile feel
ings of the poT-ulation toward the adoption of anti-semitic
and other legislation fathered by their powerful neighbor*
or their coolness toward the only powers who could possibly
come to their assistance; or by calling attention to the
fact that the tension between an autonomous part of that
state and the remainder was lessening. Bach conditiors
would be factors impelling the dictator to do what he
actually did, namely, to invade and take over.
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We may state in passing that it is hot at all
unlikely that this report of the aoproaching entente
between the Czechs and the Slovaks may well have been
one of the reasons that brought about KSFPLEP*S mission
to Tiso in March 1939. The second step which the defen
dant claims to have taken "was in February 1938, about
four weeks nrior to the invasion, in requesting von ICessel,
who was about to go to .Switzerland, to endeavor to per
suade the British to send a leading figure on a special
mission to Berlin VJho could show Hitler the power of the
British nation, and thereby could make an impression on
him. Yon Kessel testified that he contacted a Jewish
banker, Erwin Schoeller, who had political connections
in England, and urged him to talk to the British, why,
in view of hie cloFe relations with the British Ambassador,
and his other connections in London, the roundabout approach
through a Jewish Austrian banker, should have been adopted
in^^tead of a direct anproach such as he had theretofore used,
is not explained.
The third thing which "rEIZSAECFER asserts that he "
did to avoid coming events, wa's to make a significant
gesture to Attollco, the Italian Ambass^ador, when the
letter made an inquiry as to the Czech situation,
Compsred with the measures which "^IZBASctshh took
orior to Munich, these sters were, to say the least,
anemic. The defendant's statements that he did not know
of Hitler's intentions until 10 March 1939, we do not
believe to be accurate. The fact that four weeks before
he gave von Fessel the mis'^ ion hereinbefore referred to
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and the convereationp •'^hich he had viith Coulondre,
Henderson and the Czech Minister long before that date
are inconsistent with his testimony.
Me now turn to what he did and said during the
months before the invasion.
On 10 November 1938, •'•rEIZSASCFH^ dictated a memo
randum, vJhich went to MOSPM^TSTS"'', PITTER, Altenburg, and
von Piohthofen, that he received the Czech, Htoupal, end
on the latter*.s inquiry, told him that the German policy
towards Czechoslovakia was one of good-neighbor relation
ships, insofar as Czechoslovakiaintentions for close
cooperation with Germany were realized^ but that there-
was still something missing in government circles, such
as the long-drawn-out course of economic negotiations;
that he told Stoupal brutally that his government had made
a bad mistake end must react positively to the solutions
Propof^ed by Germany, and make arrangements for the treat
ment of employee contracts in order to oppose dismissals
of nationals or racial Germans, and that when Stoupal
proposed a bl-natlonal commission to handle such incidents
he replied that there should be no incidents and such com
missions were out of place. He further stated that Ptoupal
did not eypress the wl^h to work together with any agencies
of the WDAV,
The defendant received from Pibbentrop minutes of
the iatter*s meeting of 11 October 1938 with Hitler in
which was directed to notify the Polish Ambas
sador that Germany was not interested in Oderberg but
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iin MoravB-Ostrava, and Witkowitz; that vJhether Morava-
Oatrav^ snd Witkowitz remained a part of Czechoslovakia
depended on farther developments; that vith regard to
Bratislava, the Hungarians •were to be told that Germany
was, on principle, sympathetic toward the Hungarian demands,
with respect td Czechoslovakia, but Germany would resort to
«rms only if German interests were at stake» For his per
sonal information, VJEIZSAECFFR was informed that if Hungary
would mobilize, it would not be Germany's intention to
restrain her or advise moderation.
It is to be remembered that this took place within
two weeks after the Munich Agreement.
On 22 December 1938 Coulondre, French Ambassador to
Berlin, reported to the French Foreign Minister his con
ference with ^ '^TEIZSAECKER as follows;-
"^-ath regard to the international guarantee
envisaged in favor of Czechoslovakia, Baron VON
'^•.'EI^ '^AECFER was reticent. ^Vhen I reminded him that
in -^aris Herr von Ribbentrop had expressed his in
tention of reexamining the question, and asked
-whether there were any new developments, he answered
in the negative. •Could not this matter • he aaWafl
with a smile, 'be forgotten?' Since Gerianyts nL- '
dominance in that area, is a faot, would nnf
guarantee of the Reich be sufficient?' t 4-fail to remark that obligations entered in?^ 4-
be forgotten, and placed the matter in if? 2 oeiHiot
light. But I received the impression f???interlocutor had already made urMs mind!
"'Besides,' he concluded, 'it "wnin;? u
Czechoslovakia to claim that guarantee
case, we are in no hurry to settle thil «
and M. Ohva.lkovsky is not coming to
after the holidays..'- Actually the vio +f
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister has pi2 ®
postponed twice." i^-eaay been
on 28 December 1936, WEIZSAECFER reported to Ribben
trop, with copy to WOERR^ATO, that he had
^"iKea with Magis^
trati, the Italian charge d'affaires; that the latte h. d
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igflin braoohed the subject of the guaranty for the
integrity of Czechorlovakia, saying that he was directed
by Count Ciano to state that the Italians wished to pro
ceed in accord with the Germans, \VEI2SASCKEE states that
he avoided going deeper into the subject, and told him
that he had just recently explained to the French Ambas
sador, without any restraint, that Czechoslovakia depended
exclusively on Germany, end that the guaranty of any other
power was of no use; that the Czechoslovakia "of today"
v;as different from that of the time when the guaranty was
under di^^cussion, and that he had already so informed
Attolico.
On 8 February 1939 the British government stated
that it thought that the time had arrived to settle the
question of a guarantee of Czechoslovakia in accordance
with the appendix of the Munich "^aot and in view of the
statements made by the Italians in January, the British
desired the German opinion on the matter,
WFIZSAECKFR crenered the answer to this, namely,
that Germany did not think that the entry of England and
France into such an obligatory guarantee would offer any
security against the beginning or the aggravation of such
diarutes or conflicts vjhlch might arise as a result of it;
that from past experience, the Belch feared that declara
tions of guarantee on the part of the ''Vestern Powers in
favor of Czechoslovakia, would rather inteuv^ify the dis
pute between Germany and the surrounding states; that the
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attitude of the Czechosloveklan government lay in the
fact that in the paet years the various Czech govern
ments, as a result of the military guarantees given
them by ^'restern'"^owers, more or less seriously meant,
believed that they could simply by-rass the inevitable
demands of the ethnic minorities, and that the German
government was aware that, in the last analysis, the
final development in this Euronean area would come first
and foremost v^ithin the adhere of the most vital interest
of the German Reich.
On 22 February 1929 the Czechoslnvf^klan charge
d'affaires made an urgent request to confer with
SAECKER and during the interview gave him a note in which
the question of the guarantee of the rest of Czechoslovakia
was raised, and connected with it a solemn pledge of neu-
tr=^lity and non-intervention on the part of that country
and asked to be informed as soon as possible of the German
point of view, and stated th^'t like notes were about to be
delivered to Rome, ^aris and London, v^eizsaecfer reports
that he answered the Czech statement saying that whether
the sten taken in Berlin was one half or an hour earlier
or l=^ter did not seem to him to be relevant, Pind that it
struck him that the Czech government applied
• siniultaneously
to all the four Munich "^owers in such questions ^
^ , Without
first entering into discussions with Germany alone
On 3 March 1929 Mastny, the Czech Mini 4- ^i -i-iij... Ler to Berlin,
called on W^XZSASCICEP regarding the same matter end
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V.r5IZ*^A"PICKErR called hi(B attention to the answer already
given to the French and British. Mestny stated that the
guarantee would bring to an end the present state of un
certainty and give the "^rague government a better chance
to deal with these elements who disliked oooperatior. with
Germs-ny, and finally endeavored to persuade
to see Masoryk, but VJFIZS_AFCI''EH turned this suggestion
aside.
On 15 Farch the French Ambassador called on
GAFCI^R; stating that Germ-^ny's march into Bohemia on
the 14th gave reason to infer serious concern as to Ger
many's attitude towards the rest of Europe, Pnd demanded
information oi. these proceedings from German official
quarters, stating that the entry into Czechoslovakia by
German troops was in violation of the Munich Agreement
''^ IZ'^ AFCKER reported that he treated Coulondre in a rather
harsh manner, telling him that he should not talk about
the Munich Agreement being allegedly violated by Germany
and Should "abstain from giving us any lessons"; that the
Munich Agreement contained two elements, namely, the pfe
servation of peace and the French disinterest in Eastern
questions, and France should turn her eye towards the
West and ston talking about things where its nRT•t-^«^
• ^-"-Qipation,
as Germany knew from experience, did not nromota
peace; that
the French Ambassador had realized that Germanv ^
•y wuuiQ have
been forced to establish order in CzechoslovaW-i q
-^'-'vrtR.xa on her
own initiative, if the Czechoslovakian State
resident
had not desired to cell on Hitler and made tho •«
journey to
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/Berlin, and that France should realize that this was
not only a necessary actionf* but also one agreed upon
with the Czech government.
All of these statements made to the French were,
as "•^IZSAECF'T? then well knew, wholly false.
On 17 March 1939 V/EIZSAECFFR reported that the
Brit ish Press, which had stated that the German Foreign
Office had given both France and England assurances that
Germany would take no drastic steps at the very moment
when German troops had already crossed the Czech border
was wholly in error; that the French Ambassador had not
inquired on the e«y in question, but r°.ther, on ^Vednesdsy,
«na the Pritish Ambessador hsd been told five hours before
the Germsn troops msrohed over the border; thPt the British
Ambassador had been told otherwise and that Germany would
attempt to realize its demands in a decent manner, and
the invasion would take plaoe in a like manner.
on 18 Faroh 1939 the French Ambassador attempted to
deliyer a note protesting against German action, ^ffilZSAECKER
refused to accent the note and advised Ooulondre to Persuade
his government to revise their opinions. When .
^#nen the Ambesspdor
wished to go into the matter describing it as ^ violation
of the mnichPaot, •>JllZSASOFFB stated that from the\eg!i
point of view there had been astatement agreed to betw!In
the Fuehrer and Hacha, and that the OBeoh Fresident had
come to Berlin at his own wish and had immediately and
in advance declared to the Foreign Minister of the Rei h
hat he wished to plaqe the fate of his country in tne
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hpndr of the Fuehrer; that he, '-TEIZSAFGFET? did not-
think thpt the French "were holier th^n the Pope end
'^iehed to interfere in mpttere "^Phich hed been agreed
upon in an orderly faj^hion between Fr^^gue and Berlin.
^'v'EIZSAECKFH admit? that these statements "were
not true. We find it difficult to reconcile the defen-
dant*s present protevStations with the actions "which we
have just related,' There is nothing to indicate that
when Hitler's aggressive plans became imminent, as they
had been for several months, he took any measure? to
encourage the British, French or Italians to take sny
action to prevent Hitler from acting. His attitude was
radically different from what it had been prior to Munich.
The reason for th^t, we think, is obvious: Before Munich
he feared that France and England "^would take up arms in
defense of Czechoslovakia, and that if they did so, Germany
would suffer defeat, After Munich, he felt that this danger
to Germany had vanished, and he looked with complacence,
if not sp'^roval, on the future fate of Czechoslovakia,
$ He was not a mere by-stander, but acted affirmatively
and himself conducted the diplomatic negotiations both with
the victim and the interested powers, doing this with full
f knowledge of the facts. Silent disapproval is not a defense
to action. Mhile we appreciate the fact that M;IZ.SAECKSR
did not originate this invasion, and that his part was not
a controlling one, we find th^^t it was real and a neces=:a
r y
implementation of the program,
We are therefore compelled to hold him G"aTTmvj-L.ix under
Count One with resnect to the invasion of Czechoslovakia
- 69 -
Pol?nd; vjeizSAECT-T^Rattitude with respect to Poland and
the aggression against th'^'t state presents a difficult
problem. The proaecution exhibits on this phase seem to
indicate not only a anirit of intransigence but an attempt
to induce the French and British to abandon or at least
modify their Poli.^h Treaty to defend that country ag^inpt
Hitler's aggression. The claim that this Treaty gave
/
Poland a "blank check" is without merit. Neither the
British nor the French so regarded it, and their repre
sentatives repeatedly so ad.vi^ed both the Polish and
%German Foreign Office. Its purpose was to make starkly
clear to Hitler that the time for appeasement had g-ne by
nne thi? hip oft-given egsurpnoes of p fleslre for pepce end
en Pbsence of further territoriel elms v^ere regarded es
being, whPt they POtuslly vere, wholly voorthless. The
defence puggeFtr thflt this Treaty of -roteotion wes
diplomptic error, nsrticulerly because the French snd
British oomitments were mede publicly, which tended, to
enr«ge Hitler end goed him to further ection,- .Such en
assumption, however, is based upon a speculation so tenuous
that it is not worthy of oonsideretion.
The methods of confidential approach and oral repre
sentations had been already tried and found futila t.-
.-w-oxitj. Hitler
was immune to them. There was but one remedy left namely
nleinly and publicly to inform Germany that the neyt
attem^^t at aggression meant war, of conroe. ^ 4.
enragedHitler, but it made him hesitate even though it had
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effect upon his plans or his intentions. He did not
(iare make the attack in the face of the British and French
guarantees to ^oland until he had secured his eastern
boundaries from possible attack by Russia, This he did
by means of the German-Soviet Treaty of 23 August 1939.
There he not only protected himself, but, apparently, by
giving the Soviets a free hand in the Baltic states and in
Bessarabia and by agreeing to share the loot in Poland, he
gained a partner. A? long as the Polish State existed, it
is sheer nonsense to talk about Hitler's fear that the
Soviets might attack, ••.'hatever may have been the attitude
of "^oland toward Germany, there can be no question that had
the Russians attacked thej?eich, ^oland and the Baltic
states for their own preservation would have been thrown
to the side of Germany, and the suspicion which ^oland felt
toward Russia would have made a "^olish-Russian alliance
wholly unlikely. If a Russian offensive took place in the
north it could only go through ^oland, and if it took place
in the south, Hungary and Rumania were bound to stand along
side the German forces. It is quite obvious that neither
France nor England, who, in the fond hope of maintaining
"^eace, had failed to come to the aid of Austria and
Czechoslovakia, would h«ve joined in or even promoted
Russian aggression. The fact is clear that Hitler at no
time had any intention to abandon his plan to destroy
"^oland, th»t he only awaited a favorable opportunity ^nd
only fear would have prevented him from carrying out his
pl»ns.
- 71 -
"'hile giving full credit to the "^olep end their
magnificent battle to maintain their freedom and mthout
overlooking the desperate hazard of their position, far
separated as they were from their allies, the fact remains
that, at times, they did not realize the necessity of
dirplaying caution and control in handling the situation
and that their somewhat explosive attitude toward Hitler
and the Nazi ^arty, who were bent on making incidents to
justify an aggression, did not help the situation. That
these mistakes irritated one who was trying to preserve
^eace is understandable, and that he should have expressed
this irritation in talking with the French and British
Ambassadors may well explain his desire that pressure be
exerted upon'the-^oles to refrain from furnishing an excuse
which could be seized by Hitler.
^^JEIZSAHCFER had no part in the plan for l^olish
aggression, he was not in the confidence of either Hitler
or Hibbentrop. While his position was one of prominence
and he was one of the principal cogs in the machinery which
dealt with foreign policy, nevertheless, as a. rule, he
wias an implementor and not an originator. He could oppose
and object, but he could not override. Therefore, we seek
to ascertain what he dia and whether he did pii that i^y
in his power to frustrate a policy which outwardly he
apr^eared to support. If in fact he so acted, we are not
interested in his formal, official declarations, instruc
tions or lnterviev?s with foreign diplomats, in this
respect we proceed with caution and reserve before
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^ccer^ting hir defence that v^hile apparently acting
affirmatively he was in fact acting negatively.
In June 1935 a ♦•visit" of a German Naval S'qaadron
to the Port of Danzig was nroposed, andonbtedly to make a
disnlay of force which, if carried out, might well have
lit the flames of war. "^IZSASCFER fortified himself with
the opinion from Referent Famnenhoeveaer, which called
attention to the fact that, by agreement between Poland
and the Free City of Danzig, requev^-ts from foreign powers
to bring men-of-war into that ^ort were to be presented
first to the Tholes for consideration, and the diplomatic
correspondence would be conducted by th^='t country and not
by the City of Danzig, and that Germany had recognized and
oonstnntly obperved this prsctice. Bssefl on this memorandum,
P'SIZSAECIPfCR delayed the matter and on 19 luly 1939 advised
that while a warlike solution of the Danzig question would
almost always be kept in mind, bl«^me must be put on the
Poles, whereas sending part of the fleet to Danzig would
be internationally interpreted as an overture to the
generally expected German-Polish conflict.
E'^rly in July 1939 ICeitel inquired as to the
political advisability of publicly displaying certain
artillery which the Wehrmacht had smuggled into Danzig
and on 14 July '".^IZSAECI^ instructed von Nostitz to
inform Feitel that while artillery exercises were doubt
lessly necessary, they should be carried on indoors and
it would be advisable to wait -- that the Poles would
oertainly commit a new blunder whic};i could be answered
by a public ap*:^earance of the batteries, ^^otwithstending
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certpin phesep in thepe document?, the fact remains
that his advice was that of caution that inflammatory
\
incidents might be avoided, and vjas in opposition to the
Plans of Hitler and the Wehrmacht, Ti-e German-'Hussian
Treaty had not yet been negotiated, and that between the
French, British and the Soviets had not as yet failed.
AS early as 16 August 1939, Henderson, the British
Ambassador to Berlin, reports a conversation with
''TIIZSAECFFR. This is one of the documents upon which
the prosecution strongly relies, as it discloses not only
an acrimonious discussion between the Ai-bassador and the
'^itate Secretary, but also 'ajeizSAEGFEP'S irritation over
the "Polish actior and his attempt to persuade the British '
to at least modify the so-called "blank check" agreement.
To us, however, even more significant is. the fsct that he
plainly warns the British of the danger of war and of
Hitler's attitude, and before the Soviet Pact was signed
(23 August 1939) informed Henderson that he believed that
Pusf=^ian assistance to the :^oles would not only be
entirely negligible, but the tJSSP would even in the
join in sharing the "^olish spoils. Thus the British
received explicit warning, ^^nd the door was open to the
either to endeavor to block the execution of any pact
between Germany and Pussia, or, if this were impracticable
otherwise to prepare themselves for the evpnf -revent, .je
believe that ore who was in favor of the prospective
aggression against "^oland would reveal the likelihood d
imminence of a Germon-Bursian "^act.
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"7e do not rely upon the affidavitp of the Swiss,
Karl J. Burokhardt, who was then International Commissioner
for Danzig, except insofar as they are corroborated from
other sources, tbis for the reason that the witness did
not appear for cross-examination, either because of his
^ own reluctance or upon instructions from his government,
V'e find it difficult to reconcile a willingness, personal
I or governmental, to permit an ^ narte statement to be
given and an unwillingness to permit inquiry as to the
accuracy of the statement.
Turning now to the contemporaneous documents of
15 A\iga^t 1939, 'TEIZrj^ECI\ER had discussions with both
Fender-^on and Coulondre, French Ambassador. These are
official reports. While the conversations express an
attitude on the part of 7JEIZSAECrER inconsistent with his
present claim that he disagreed with the policies of Hitler
and Ribbentrop, and are critical of Polish policy, and
express the hope that the policy it was pursuing wom(i
lessen the bond between the Western "'^ owers and Warsaw
it is also clear that he informed both Ambassadors of the
imminent danger and likelihood of war. Henderson says*
'"•men last I saw him (State Secretary
">m;iZSAFCFER) , he had regarded the position
as less dangerous than last year.; now he
considered it no less dangerous and most
urgent•"
Both Ambassadors clearly warned •'/SIZ^AECICER that if the
Poles were compelled by any act of Germany to resoi.t to
arms to defend themselves, there was not a shadovj of
a
doubt that the Western Powers would give them
'^upnort
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Coulondre went even further and stated:
"I advised him not to lose himself in
subtleties; the fact was that if any of the
three Allies, France, England, and Poland,
were attacked, the other two would automatically
be at her side."
Long nrior to this, and when Hitler's planvS for
•Polish aggression again became more clear, ^'/EIZSASCKSR
instructed iCordt in London to discuss the situation with
Lord Halifax and others connected with the British Foreign
Office, and to point out the necessity speedily to pursue
their negotiations with the Soviet Union for a treaty of
mutual a?^sistance against German aggression, Kordt
received assurances that the-^e negotiations were certain
to be successful.
On 17 August 1939 Coulondre reported to the quai
d'Orsay, and described not only his own views, but the
comments of the Briti-h Ambassador after his discussion
with the defendant. Coulondre says:
"In this connection I was extremely strnnvby the fact that, on the same day, the ^tatp
necretary had asked both my British coIIpp^L
and.'myself the same Question, namely
your Government wage war on the sidp ,
if thp cnnfiint hpd hppn Polande o l c a bee nrovoked bv thP i
This question might have been a-ked P-i+-H
order of higher authorities and becanpp pS ^
was doubt on the subject, or because tL
State Secretary, onrosed to war anfl
8t the development of the eitustionhave liked to gein from oar replies'sunnort
for action in higher quarters. i •;;;;»?•
towards the first hypothesis, but whichevp^!^^^
the alternatives is correct, the question
strikes me as a particularly grave onp
would seem to indicate that Hitler i=;
harboring illusions on the attitude of^v
and England in the event of a Germpn
German conflict, or at least thnt ptt-
are still being made to delude him on
subject," the
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ViTElZSA'iiCKER Exhibit 1?,0 is it^entifief^ by Ellinore
Greinert as being carbon cooies of memoranf^a written by
WEIZSA-^CKER an(^ given to her for safekeeping in 1939 by Dr.
Viktor Bruns. ';^hey are datea 30 August, 31 August, 5 Septem
ber, and 7 September 1939. -^he first states that the British
Embassy, which haf" been asked late on the night of the S9th
' of August to undertake the task of having Polsnd son'^ a Pleni
potentiary for negotiations, at Your o'clock in the morning
- reported the technical difficulties in bringing the Plenipo-
I tentiary to Berlin before the end of 30 August, and at eleven
a.m. pleaded for uiore time, and that the B-pitieii a.v,-uijxxois-n Ambassador in
* • " the afternoon wrote Ribbentrop to the same effec'- wvt
w. W^X Z SA iiCXER
relates the mirnisht interview between ^fnaerson ano Ribbentrop,
at which the latter h-^istily read the German proposal and
refused to give Henderson a copy on the basis that i-h
- -'' 11 w a, s
outdated.
The mcmorand'um of 31 .August states that the whol ^
, ay
had been de-voted to the question whether or nnt «
^ connection
^ „ betw: en Warsaw and Berlin could be established and th. t h
WEIZSAECKER, had suggested that the Polish Ambassador h, ^
I be given an audience; that WEIZSAECKEH discusspd
mis matter
with Ribo'Sntrop who disagreed, and that WEIZSAECK^r
" thereupon
offered, to resign and "even more"; that he told Rikv.
^iDbentrop
that he, A-blZSAECKbR, would be a swine if he did *.
- ^ct tell him
wha1i he thought,
I As a result, Lipskl was received but sent away with the
formal excuse that he did not possess any authority i
tiate,
-77-
The memorpnclajii of 5 September 1939 Is e. history
of the efforts, beginning as esrly ss April 1933, which
he claims to have made to preserve peace and his hope
th«t the Italians, on £ September, would endeavor to bring
about a truce,
^ The memorandum of 7 Septem,ber recites that when
all other attempts to bring a "^olish :^lenipotentiary to
f Berlin had failed by twelve o'clock on 31 August, the only
remaining hope resided in German military circles, he
informed Goering that it was high time he came and asked
him whether they were obliged to allovv an insane advisor
of Hitler to destroy the Reich; he said that Ribbentrop
would be the first one to hang, but others would follow;
that Goering had implored the Fuehrer three times to
give in, but Hitler only shouted at him and sent him away.
He said: i
"I told Brauchitsch that politics were
at an end. I said that we were dealing not
only with Poland, but also with England and
France. That was certain. I said to him that
the military, i.e. he, Brauchitsch, would
h«ve to bear the responsibility before history
if we entered into this war,?^nd I asked him
if he wanted to take uPon himself this
responsibility just because Hitler had an
insane advisor. All that Brauchitsch had to
say was th'^t the Fuehrer did not think that
the English and the French would participate
in this war and that was what Brauchitsch
would bave to go by. When I asked him
whether or not he was reading the newspapers
he only shrugged his shoulders. Thus my l^^st
hope vanished."
These documents, if genuine, are of utmost
significance. We think that they are suspiciously
and no reason appears for writing them unless one was
/
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attempting to speak to history. '7e •would receive them
only with'the greatest caution unless they were corrobo
rated. To a large extent they are. First," there ere
the entries in the von Hassel diaries, the genuineness
of which is not questioned, von Hassel wes in early
pnd continuous opposition to Hitler, an opposition which
ended only with his execution after the unsuccessful
v-atsch of 20 July 1944. We quote:
' "August 31, 1939:
^This morning at seven tvjenty-five '.'•JEIZSAECKER
called me asked me to meet him at eight-forty.
He explained that^he had to de»l with the follow-'
"ing situation: Since nothing had been hear(j go
far from the "Poles, Bibbentrop had called for"
Henderson last night and had railed at "him
exclaiming that these delaying tactics of the
English and Poles were contemptible. The German
Government had been prepared to make a very
acceptable proposal, which he read to Henderson
Essentially it contained the following points:
Danzig to be ceded to the Reich, but demili
tarized; referendum in the m^in part of the
Corridor, and, depending upon the result, either
a German east-west traffic route or a Polish
south-north route to Gydnia, which would remain
Polish. But these definitely modest terms were
of course no longer open a? no Polish negotiator
had come. Therefore there was nothing left for
Germany but to take action to secure its rights.
pflfter thie unfriendly interview, which
did not constitute a complete break, Hitler
made it known th=^t the other rids had now put
^ itself clearly in the wrong, pnd that there
fore attack might- begin thir afternoon,
'^.'EIZPAECICSR considera the rituation extremely
serious; matters stand exactly where they were
on Friday. Fast we really be hurled into the
abyss because of two madmen?
"Of course one can never be sure with
Hitler: it is not entirely out of the question
that he will recoil at the last moment. But
v/e agreed that we could h°rdly expect this to
happen ainoe, after all, Hitler had really
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'decided on war Friday and had given orders to that
K.''' effect. Under the circumstances h'EIZSAECKCR could
see only one hope, - that Henderson should
immediately persuade the Polish Ambassador and
his ovn government to urge '".'arsaw this very
morning to send a Plenipotentiary at once, or
at least to have Lipski announce this intention
to Ribbentrop before noon. Could I 'privately'
influence Henderson to this end, and could I
perhaps also v.'om Goering about the rash decision
of Hitler? Goering should bo made to understand
that Ribbentrop v-as digging the graves of the
Reich and of Hatlonal Socialism. Harinhall would
go up in flames.' I said I was pr'epared to try
my luck.
4
"liy impression v/as that Ribbentrop and Hitler
are in a spirit of criminal recklessness,- They
are running the most fearful risks, involving the
whole German people, merely tosave their Own
prestige by some minor success, - all this, of '
course, being only a temporary stopgap. So far
as I am concerned the one vital thing is to avoid
a world Y>rsr.
"I found Henderson at breakfast; he had
got to bed at four o'clock. He was, above all
shocked at Ribbentrop's bad manners, Ribbentrop
v/as evidently determined to play In this v;ar the
baneful role Berchtold had played in the last one
Henderson said Ribbentrop had read him the German*
proposals very hurriedly (liad gabbled them') had
not given him a copy because they v/ere nov; 'water over
the dam.' The peremptory character of our latest
move was destroying all efforts to keep the peace
I e::plainGd the situation to him and emphasized thq-'-
I came'entirely as a private person and without
orders, and had only the desire to heir in reachino-
a peaceful solution by making clear to^him the
stupendous significance of the next fev; hours
"He said that during the night he had been
in touch with London, as v/ell as with Linski 1
that he would continue his efforts, The"^" chief
difficulty lay in our methods, ^artlcularlv the
way in which v/o expected the English to order tbA
roles around like stupid little boys. i told h*
that th.c persistent silence of the Poles was al
objectionable. This Slavic behavior, with vbLlch^
he doubtlessly had become familior in Petersburg
was dangerous. He said, nostalgically, he wiahp,?
those times would only come back, - times I
countered, with a poor attempt at jostin^' in
which he had almost strangled his ambassador r
it seemed to me, he was in a mood to stran®lp
In conclusion, Henderson said it would be others.
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easy to reach an understanding between England
and Germany if it v/ere not for the calamitous
Ribbentrop. V/ith him it would never be possible.
"About nine-thirty I vrent to Olga Riegele,'
told her that the situation v;as terribly serious,
and asked her to arrange a meeting between rae and
her brother Hermann (Goering). Tearfully the good
woman did so at once. Shevas successful in reach
ing him at his *battle station,' as he later put
it, and I had a long conversation with him. He
asked at once whether I v/anted to talk with him
about the Italians, I said 'No,* but stated that
I was a friend of Henderson who was doing all he
could to keep the peace, Goering asked why, in
that case, he had been so 'snooty' durinp- the
latest discussions. I'answered I did not believe
that was his intention, but possibly it v/as
difficult for some people to get along,
"Goering said he liked Henderson but that he
was too slow. I answered that naturally he-wa« an
Englishman and not a Latin, but he v/as doin'^ his
very best, Goering said he thought our proposal
was really modest, to which I replied that it had
been described as no longer valid, Goerin-^ there
upon became very animated and asked hov; Henderson"
could have reached this conclusion since the
proposal would become invalid only if no Polish
negotiator arrived; T answered that this point
v/as most important, that I v'ould tell Henders(
at once and urge him to exert himself further
that direction.
ion
in
"Goering: 'Yes, but he must come nnce. » ... ..i
"I: 'That is technically impossiblcj it must
suffice if the Polos declare they will
send one,'
"Goerings 'Yes, 'but he must come very ouickT-rr
Go tell the Foreign Linister immediatel
v/hat you have heard from Henderson, »
"I; I do not know whether I can do thok v. '
any case, I ^/ill tell '•'EIZ3AECKEH. t ^
"Ily impression v/as that Goering reallv
peace, Olga had previously told me, weepW
recently he had put his arms about her and
'Now, you see, ever3rbody is for war, onlv T Ju'
soldier, and Field i:arshal, am not. ' ^
"But why, then, docs this man, at th ^
sit in Oranienburg? And Brauchitsch and ^ ®
are flying about over the West Wall,' aloer
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"I went back to Henderson at once and told
him what G-oering had said. He was greatly inter
ested anci_wrote down the most important parts,
"^hen to WiilZSALCKHR, to whom I reported the steps
I had taken.
"After an hour V/EIZSAHCKER called for me
'again. Henderson had requested the text of our
proposals in order to have something to show to
the Poles. Officially WEIZSAECKER was not per
mitted to give'it to him. Rid I think it possi
ble to give Henderv=ion a more detailed knowledge
of the contents, w>^ich meant perhaps to put the
paper itself into his hands? The document lay
before me on the table.
"At that moment a telephone call came from
Ribbentrop, and immedia'^ely thereafter a second
The gist of both was that Henderson should not
be given the proposals. He v^imself would call
and tell him that the Poles had. been plainly
told they would get the proposals if they sent
a plenipotentiary, agreed that under these
conditions it was now impossible to give ^endersnn
the document or any further details,^. son
t
"Riboentrop had forbidden WEIZSAECKER to hava
any further dealings with Henderson and had added
that Hitler had ordered all advances be rebuff ^
That was proof for WEIZSAECK^jR that Hitler and^
Ribbentrop wanted war; they imagined their propn
sals had furnished them an alibi. This seems n
sensical to me if the proposals are not given to"*"
the Poles,
"Hib^entrop further stated that during the
next half hour it would'be decided, whether the
proposals should, be mad'e public. If t^is is
under disoussion, It Is altogether InoomprehenfM
why the proposals should not be given tn ®
unless they want war. ^^©rson,
"WEIZSAECKER said Rome was making effnrta i-
mediate in I^nndon. '^'^ussolini is said to h v
declared that a fait nouveau had to be creat^fl
and the best move would be for Poland to ced
Danzig to G-ermany at once. WEIZSAECKER wao Z
doubtful whether the Poles would do that
for its part, informed the Italians that'the
question now was one of honor; w^^ether we
Lipski to call or whether he was to come of\i
own accord. With this in mind i discussed
WEIZSAECKER whether 1 should go to Henderso
more to induce him to get Lipski out of hi
But we agreed that Henderson knew the situ^fi
would do all he could anyway. Perhaoa t and
go to see him. shall still
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"Afternoon. I did go to ca.ll on Henderson
and met him in front of the embassy. I told him
everything depended on Lipski'g putting in an ,
appearance — not to ask questinns, but to deolpre
his readiness to negotiate — but at once. He
wanted to support this suggestion immediately, I
also told Henderson that Goering had arrived.
Young Kessel had Just seen him drive in,
"At the Foreign Office I had met Moltke(Ambassador in WarsTaw) and arranged to bave lunch
-with him at the Adlon. Ag I arrived at the hotel
Kessel appeared in great alarm to tell me that
Lipski bad presented himself, but that there was
a. reluctance to receive him. Since Moltke had.
told me the same thing a few minutes before, I
tried first by telephoning Olga Riegele to influ
ence Hermann Goering, with the request that he
give me a hearing if possible, I did not succeed
however, Kessel declared the danger was extremeIv
grave. V/EIZSAKCKHR had to M him the best thine:
would be to persuade Mussolini to telephone Hitler
at once.
"Could I go to see Attolico? I was not very
anxious to perform this mission, but in view of
the situation_I said I would, Attolico received
me at once. He swore that once upon a time he had
done everything possible for me I And I promised
absolute silence concerning our conversation. He
• understood instantly what was at issue, and pro
mised to telephone Rome at once,"
We also have the affidavit of the widow of Ambassador
Attolico, which bears out WEIZSAECKER'S statement that he
induced the Italian Ambassador to inform Rome of the impend
ing danger and to persuade Mussolini to intervene. That thig
was done is apparent from the Ciano diaries. These entries
begin with 19 July 19.*^9, as follows:
"July 19, 19?9:
"I sumiuon Magi strati to Rome on the matter
of the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini
which is set for the fourth of August, i fear
that it is due to Attolico's endemic crisis of
fear. Nevertheless, we must prepare the meet
ing weH in order to prevent its being futile
Perhaps, in view of the fact that for
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many reasons war plans must be delayed as long
as possible, he could talk to the Fuehrer about
launching a proposal for an international peace
conference,..,. But v/hat are the real intentions
of Hitler? Attolico is very much concerned and
Y/arns of the imminence of a new and perhaps
fatal crisis.
July 20, 1939:
"The information sent by Attolico continues
* to be alarming. Prom v;hat ho say;3, the Germans
are preparing to strike at Danzig by the four
teenth of August. And for the first time Caruso
from Prague announces movements of forces on a
^ vast scale. But is.it possible that all"this
should take place v/ithout our knowing it, indeed,
after so many protestations of peace made by our
Axis comrades? bb shall see....
"July 21, 1939:
"Ilassimo (Count Tagistrati, Counsellor to the
Italign Embassy in Berlin) is not so pessimistic
about the situation and he confirms my suspicions'
That sAttolico permitted himself to be carried av/av
in a fit of panic v'ithout very good reasons ~
"July 22, 1939:
"I take I.Iagistrati to the Duco, who has
v/orked out a plan of v; el come for the meeting
at Brenner Pass. It is based on the proposal
of an international conference. The Duce outlines at some length the reasons for our pro-"
posal. I am skeptical of the possibilities of
such a conference actually taking place but I
agree on the utility of our move which will
above all, throw confusion'and dissension
the camp of the opposition, ^7here many voic^
are already being heard against war.
"I insist on tv/o points: (i) That the
condition must be included that our urnnncoTbe considered valid only if the Germans do not
previously decide to wage war, since, in that
case, it I'oulo be useless bo discuss anvtb-in-irr.
(2) that Ribbentrop is interested irf the
question. I am doubtful, very doubtful ahnnt
Attolico»s ability now. lie has lost his head
I am sending a telegram to Hagistrati ordering
him to take part personally in all the necrotl?
tions.... '• • ' negotla.
"July 26, 1939:
"I talked by telephone with Ulapiatrpi-^
about the conversation with Ribbentrop. hL
-84'
reaction to the proposal of an international
conference was unfavorable. He vriii talk
about it to the Fuehrer, but it is now easy
to see that nothing; will come of it. In
which case, it v/ould seem to be a good idea
to postpone the meeting of the two chiefs.
In any event, before suggesting a decision to
the Duce, I prefer to await the arrival of
Attolico's message that is to be sent by
airplane....
'•July 27, 1959;
".... I receive Attolico^s report, which I
send to the Duce. The boner pulled by the
Ambassador becomes more and more evident. Once
again Ribbentrop has affirmed the German deter
mination to avoid war for a long time. The idea
of postponing the useless meeting at the Brenner
Pass takes hold of me more-and more. However I
ask the Duce to read tho report before he mMros
any decision ....
"July 28, 1939;
"After rocdin- the report, tho Duce decided
to postpone his mcotinG i"ith Eltler and I thrnl^
he did well. I telephone Attolico, who la -fVii
tryin:; t o kid us. This time Attolico missed
boat. Her as frishtenod by his o'-n shadow nnf®
probablyi with somebody in the Gorman Porei^
Uinistry, was trying to save his country from i
non-existent danger. It's too bed. This Amba
dor has done good work, but now he permits hims»?^
to be taken in by the war panic. This may easlii
he explained by the fact that he is a rich man
"It appeeers that Hibbentrop has asked timo
to report to Hitler, who hod expressed himseie
against the conference. Tomorrow v;e shin
reply on the postponement.... nave a
"August 2, 1939;
"....Attolico continues to harp on his
favorite theme of the meeting of Hitler and
llussolini, still insisting on tho bugbear nr
sudden decision that will be made bgr Iliti-
the fifteenth of August, The insistence of
Attolico keeps me v/ondering. Either this
Ambassador has lost his head or he sees
knows something which Iir.s completely esc^^^
us. Appearances are in favor of the fir ?
alternative, but it is necessary to
events carefully. ^ observe
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"August 3, 1939;
"... llassimo writes a private letter from
which it appears that he is in disagreement with
the Ambassador as to the danger of an approaching
crisis. He advises us against asking the Germans
for a clarification of their program. If hassimo
notwithstanding his considerable, his very great
caution, has decided to take such a step, it means
that he is sure of what he is doing. I have trans
mitted his letter to the iXice. Roatta, the new
military attache, on the other hand, informs us of
the concentration of forces and movements en the
Polish frontier. Vlho is right? I may be mis
taken, but I continue to feel optimistic.
"August 4, 1939;
Attolico's alarmist bombardment
continues. The situation seems obscure to me.
I am beginning to think of the possibility of
a meeting with vonRibbentrop. The moment
has come when v/e must reall^r know how matters
stand. The situation is too serious for us to
view developments passively ....
'•'August 6, 1939;
".... •Ve discussed the situation, v/e are in
agreement in feeling that ve must find some way
out. By following the Germans we shall go to
v;ar and enter it under the most favorable condi
tions for- the Axis, and especially for Italy,
Our gold reserves arc reduced to almost nothing,
as well as our stocks of metals, and we are far
from having comploted our autarchic and military
preparations. If the crisis comes we shall
fight if only to save our 'honor*. But we must
avoid war. I propose to the Duce the idea of my
mooting with von Rihbontrop, - a meeting which"
on the svirfacG would have a private character
but du.ring which I v/ould attempt to continue '
discussion of Ilussolini's project for a \7orld
peace conferenco. lie is 'quite favorable.
Tomorrow v/e shall discuss the matter further
hut I am convinced that the Duce wants to move
vigorously to avoid the crisis. And in so
doing he is right.
"August 7, 1939;
"....The Duce has approved my meeting with
von Ribbentrop, and I have therefore telephoned
Attolico instructions on this point. Attolico
himself had thought of something of the snri ov. i
v/as very glad,.., ,
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"August 8, 1939;
Kassimo v/rltea in a rather soothing
tone from Berlin, He does not foresee any
immediate aggressive intentions on the part of
Germany oven though the Danzig situation is
grave and dangerous.
"August 9, 1939;
"vonHibbentrop has approved the idea of our
meeting. I decided to leave tomorrow night in
order to meet him at 3alzburg. The Duce is
anxious that I prove to the Germans, by documen
tary evidence, that the outbreak of w ar at this
time would be folly. Our preparation is not such
as to allow us to believe that victory will be
certain. The probabilities are 50 per cent at
least so the Duce thinks. On the other hand
v;ithin three years, the probabilities will be
80 per cent, Ilussolini lias alv;aya in mind the
idea of an international peace conference. I
believe the move would bo excellent.
"August 10, 1939;
"The Duce is more than ever convinced of
the necessity of delaying the conflict. He
himself has worked out tho outline of a report
concerning the meeting at Salzburg which ends
Y/ith an allusion to interrtational negotiations
to settle the problems that so dangerously
disturb.European life.
"Before letting me go he recommends that T
should frankly inform tho Germans that we muqt
avoid a conflict with Poland, since it v/ili be
impossible to localize it, and a general w^r
would be disastrous for everybody. Never haq
the Duce spoken of tho need for peace with qn
much Y/armth and without reserve. i agree
him 100 per cent, and this conviction wm i! -.
me to redouble my efforts. But I am doubtfi.?^
as to the results." "uoriul
Hitler receiv^ Ciano and assured him that the
with Poland could be localized, and although Ciano e-^--
pressed grave misgivings and pointed out Itrlytg inability
to wage war, he fell under Hitler *s spell and v/eakenod
On 7 August 1939 von Ilassol records the follov/in
in his diary;
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''Host Important events Ten or twelve days
ago Attolico celled on lliblDentrop (after having
seen ' "SIZSAEGJOZR) and finally Hitler, with a
mcssa-^^e from the 3Duce to the following effect:
the meeting of the Duce and the" Fuehrer at the
Brenner, set for August 4, would he useful only
if Something tangible should come out of it.
And, in view of the entire situation, this some
thing could only bo a decision to call a'six-
powcr' conference (Italy, G-ormany, Prance, England,
Spain,'Poland) in order to solve the Italian-
French, as well as the G-erman-Polish, conflicts.
If this Y^ere not done now it v;ould have to be
done in four to six vieoks * time. This message
had the effect of a thunderbolt."
On 20 August 1939, Heel, French Ambassador in V/arsaw
wrote the French Foreign ^^inister as follov^s:
•'prom a very reliable source I learned that
WilhelmstrassG circles were gravely concerned by
the turn of events, and believe that Ilerr Hitler
is determined to settle the jjanzig question
*bofore the first of September.'"
This information could only have come from '^inillZSAEGHEr
or one of his circle in the Foreign Office,
On 31 August 1939 Cicno r ecorded the follovdnp-•
'"An ugly av/ckoning, Attolico telegraphs at
nine, saying that t he situation is desperate- and
that unless something now comes up there vd.ll be
war in a few hours. I go quickly to the Palazzo
Venezia. We must find a new solution. In a'Troe-
ment with the Duce I call Halifax by telephone to
tell him that the Duce can intervene with
only if he brings a fat prizes Danzig,- Emntv-
handed he can do nothing. On his part. Lord
Halifax asks me to bring pressure on Berlin
that certain procedural difficulties ma-^ be'over
come and direct contacts established between
Gormany and Poland.
"I telephone thia to Attolico, who la more
and more pessimistic. After a while Halifax aend^
word that our proposal regarding Danzig cannot be
adopted,"
These exhibits corroborate, in almost every detail'
the oral testimony of the defenfpnt and his witnf»c!c«e m,
* o t)Qs ^ i hey
are drav/n from sources which are unimpeached.
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We deem the fact to he established that instead of
. participatins, planning, pr-eparin-g 02? initiating the
war against Poland, the defendant used every means ir*
his "oower to prevent the catastrophe# He as not master
of the situation; he had no decisive voice, but he did
not sit idly by and atolidly follow the dictates of
either Hitler or Ribbentrop, but by warnings to other
powers, v/hem he knew would be involved in the war if
Hitler^s mad plan came to fruition, and by suggestions
which he caused to be made to England to hasten the
completion ,of its proposed pact \7ith Russia, and by bring
ing all the pressure ho could, to cause the Italians to
intervene, ho s.ou^j^t to avert it. Although tncse efforts
Y/oro futllo, his lack of success is not the criteria.
Personalities, hesitation, lack of vision and tne tioe
of events, over which he had no control, sv/ept away his
efforts. But for this ho is not at fault.
We find that he is ROT? GUILTY under Count One
respecting aggressive v/ar against Poland.
Denmark and Norway; On 16 March 1940 von Hassel records
the followings
TSISSAECrUiiR is alarmed because, on the
occasion of R^-trop-s visitJo^Hojne^^^
Karch 10-11. l.u.solinl^r offensive,
a •' ord 'ibrotherhood In destiny' and
Tout spoke of our Mo^n conflict. He
of his indention g^ya'^ iona regarding the
had, hoY/ever, maae rescivc.
date of his action.
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explp.natiorx is this: Mussolini
received the distinct impression that Hitler
is determined to atteck. This being so, he
thinks it. would be a tactical error to issue
further warnings and now prefers to show him
self sympathetic. If, contrary to expectation,
things go well and if everything else looks
favorable, he will come in oii our side. Should
matters go badly, he still has an alibi and can
work out a way to extricate himself...."
Some months before the invasion of Henmark and Norway,
VJEIZSAECEEP received information from Canaris that this
matter was being considered but was unable to obtain details. '
It appears that on 6 April "rsiZSAECKEB was present at a
conference with the ""ehrmacht, at which the Foreign Office
was informed of the details of the plan and of the part
it Was expected to pl^y on the diplomatic side. On the
same day he had a conference with Pibbentrop at which Gaus
was nresent. It does not anpear which conference was the
earlier. Gaus made two statements about this matter: one
which he confirmed on the witness stand, and one which he
made to the interrogating officer sometime in 1946. In
the latter he states th^ '^t '^raiZSAECrER seemed as surprised
nt the news as he himself was, and "both of us reacted to
this sudden information by pointing out ineffectually that
it would awaken a storm of resentment throughout the whole
world•"
0
In the later affidavit, which he confirmed on the
vjitness stand, he deposed that 'JEIZSAECPEP did not seem to
be surorised and made no protest. In view of these
conflicting statements, we cannot say, with the necessary
degree of certainty, where the truth lies, but in view of
the f«ct th^t it was only on 3 April th-t iceitel informed
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Bibbentrop of the plan, apologizing for the fact that
the Foreign Office would have so little time to prepare
its diplomatic tasks, it is unlikely that "''ffllZSAFCFER
had precise information before 6 Arril,
We deem the preci?=^e date of ^'^JFIZSASCFEBknowledge
as immaterial. Hitler had already made his decision, the
Wehrmacht had made its plans, and was in fact on the move,
although acting with utmost secrecy. Fothing which
^•JFIZSAECKFR could have done would have had any effect on
the situation, and there vjas little or no time for maneuver
ing and little, and probably no, opportunity to give warning.
The part that the Foreign Office pDayed in the matter of
these two aggressions is insignificant and consisted in
sending notes by courier to its renresentatives in Denmark
and Norway, who were, at a specified hour and day, to
communicate their contents to those governments. These
notes were not prepared by ^mZSAFCT^ and the most which
can be said is that he either ordered or knew of the
aispatch of the courier.
But even here there are some indications that the
defendant was perturbed about the possibility of the war
being further extended. In March 1940, Sumner Welles,
then Undersecretary of State for the United States of
America, visited Berlin, We quote frocr his book, "The
Time for Decision*'*.
**Ribbentrop has a comcletely closed mind.
It struck me as also a very stupid mind. The'
man is saturated with hate for England to the
exclusion of any other dominating mental
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influence. He ie clearly without background
in international affaire, and he was guilty
of a hundred lies in his rresentation of
German policy during recent years.
*T:ate that seme afternoon I went to see
rtate Secretary VOH in his office
at the Foreign Office. In the German official
hierarchy, the position of state secretary has
corresponded since the days of Bismarck to that
•of undersecretary of state in our own country...
"X snoke with Herr VOH "-.'EIZF-ABGFER of my
earlier conversation with Ribbentrop, and after
hesitating a moment, "rSIZSAECF^R said: *X am
going to be quite frank with you, X have been
strictly instructed not to discuss with you in
any way any subject which relates directly or
indirectly to the possibility of peace,*
•"He then drew his chair toward the center
of the room and.motioned to me to do likewise.
It was evident that the omnipresent German
secret r^olice dictaphones vjere installed in
the walls rather than in the central lighting
fiytures.
•''7e had for a while a desultory conversa
tion. I then reverted again to my conversation
with Ribbentrop, I said that, if the feeling of
the German Government as a whole was as decisive
as that of Herr von Ribbentrop that a war of
devastation and of conQuest "'as the only course
for Germany to follow, I would be needlessly
taking up the time of the German authorities by
prolonging my stay.
"Herr VON ^•'rEIZ'^ AECT^R thought a good three
before rer^lvine. Then ho i ,
-ncix vwiv '-.j-'-j- OOG
minutes y g e leaned toward
me and said: *Xt is of the utmost importanc
aoTT TiO-rranvnoTT^r 4-r-. i-'u-
o xu j-c ux on b c p
that you say that personally to the Fuehrer when
you see him tomorrow.♦
••X waited a moment myself, and then a^'ked
him: *Xet me have your cer^onal advice, for I
am now asking en entirely perronal question
Bo you believe that any suggestions for peace
conversations proffered by Mussolini would have
onu favorable reception here?*
•'This time Herr VOF again waited
before answering. His reniy v^hen it came waa^
•^•That X have already said ebout the Fuehrer ' *
But.• endanswers a cart of your question.
here he motioned to the Foreign Office in t.f.he re.Tnhions between GerLnu
greatly.» ^ ^
we were,
and Italy
here
have
relatio s
narrowed
-
...... •.j.Xa.'r.: E2i-
"The only interpretation v^Jhich could be
drawn from his statement was that in ''\r5IZSAECrER'S
oninion, if the Duce were to approach Hitler
directly and secretly, it might'have some effect.
If Ribbentrop knew of the approach he would do
his utmost to block it."
'••hile it is not wholly clear that '^ ^IZSAECKER spoke
with reference to Denmark and Norway, it is, we think,
apparent that he' was apprehensive of future action on the
part of Hitler and v^as endeavoring to have pressure brought
on Mussolini. We find '^jEIZSAECKER NOT GUILTY under Count
One as to Denmark and Norway,
✓
The LOW Countries. The plans for the aggressive invasions
and wars against Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg were
prepared shortly after the beginning of the Polish war.
^"EIZSAECirSR admits that he knew them as early as 12
October 1939, and verified that it was only a question
of when they would be put in motion. For various reasons
these invasions were postponed from time to time, but
finally" erupted on 10 May 1940.
The question for determination is not whether
^f^I7f=^AECKER had prior knowledge, but what, if anything,
did, either to implement, or, on the other hand, to
prevent and frustrate these invasions. We shall in
particular deal with these in the reverse order.
It was obvious to the defendant that these invasions
if carried out, had but dne Purpose, namely, a flanking
movement against France, thus avoiding the hazards of
direct attack against the Maginot line. On 12 October,
that is, immediately after he became aware o-f the plans
he fufhished Rlbpehtrop with a memorandum and followed
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it up by a discussion of 26 October, We quote from these
memorande because they are significant:
*"'7ithout v-aiting to anticipate the proper
military judgment, the following is an
accomplished fact in my orinion:
"lo The submarine f=nd surface commercial
war, in consideration of the present number of
warships, is not able to interfere with the
British supplies from overseas to such an eixtent
as to compel Great Britain to assume a. concilia
tory attitude, even if enemy and neutral shins
are ^unk without warning. The German submarine
building program v^ill be able to meet the
requirements only after a considerable time.
"2. The war in the air against British
supplies from overseas can likeviise not be
conducted effectively this v;inter.
*'3. Bven a combination of noints 1 and 2
meaning the intensified war on the sea and in '
the air against the British sea lanes would be
inadeouate today. Any such waging of the war
must be undertaken with sufficient means and
wdth lightning sneed unless it reters out.
"4. In consideration of the structure of
Greet Britain, airraids on the vital targets on
land would not give much hone for dealing
deadly blow to Great Britain,
"Anart from'^the military reasons there are
^ also political viewpoints which forbid the
starting of the unlimited war by submarine^
and in the air in the near future. This manner
of wiarfare would force the neutral seafarins
states into the arms of Great Britain The
> . would oresumacly soon disrupt their reletinnc,t with us. Psychological end materiel rLer^e^
similar to thofe of 1917-18 «oaia be unevolaable
a- 8 conpequence of the unreatrioted submarine
war. For thip_reaPon vre would make new enemlea
without being in the possession of arm® whioi
would force Great Britain to her knees.
sniitting off France from Great
Britain by force and to induce her to concluflr=
senarete neace, an offensive against France r,n
land would be necessary. According to mv
information, the success of a frontal
along the border between Germany and T^r-nop"
would come too costly. An offensivp \Belgium would perhaps result in bringing thi
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country into our h^nd^, but v>;ould not open
the road for an entry into France, -^e v-ould
only have a new, juat as long and only much
weaker defense-line than we have today. The
BTten^ion of the war theatre would benefit
only France and not Uv<=. Both methods — the
frontal and the flanking attack — will not
lead to the military target and. would only
awaken the fighting snirit of the French
citizen and soldier which is, still dormant
today. Whether the possession of Belgium
would actually be irdisrensable and decisive
in the war in the air against Great Britain,
must be left open,
*'From political viewnoints, the entry in
Belgium ould earn us only all the disadvantages
with which we are sufficiently acquainted from
the year ofl914.
"Obviously, our strength lies in the
defense. It is nearly impregnable, it gives us
the wanted military security. It saves our
material. It helps us to keer the neutral
groups intact..'..
If the enemy does not commit the grave
error of violating the neutrality in a serious
manner, then we can hope that the constant
inactivity of a defense on both siees win
slov'ly weaken the will to fight in France until
it dies. And that would open the road to peace.
The decision on whether we better remain on the*
defensive in the west or start an offensive
after the conclusion of the "^oland campaign is
8 matter of politics to a large extent,
"An offensive would be imperative if it is
expedient to bring the war to a speedy end. put
there is no promire for such a success. The riow-
and the political effects would not be in harmonv
with each other. It goes without saying that
the defensive is also a test of our nerves a?
well. Nevertheless, I'ith Poland we have a pawn
in our hands, while the enemy still has to procure
such a pawn.
"The offensive would be the beginning of the
struggle for life or death. And the third Parties
would have the last laugh. The defensive still
leaves us the possibility of a negotiated peace
•^ending developments, I believe that the defensive
should be mairtained.
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"Having received information that a general
offenFive witti an invaaion of Luxembourg, Belgium
and Holland wpf being prepared in the beginning
or in the middle of November, I submitted a brief
memorandum to Herr von Ribbentrop on 12 October
»39, in which I discussed the military plans for
the six winter months from the political view
points and in particular advised against the
invasion of the three neutral countries.
"On IP October we had a conference on this
matter during which Herr von Ribbentrop briefly
mentioned the reasons pro and con, but spoke
dispassionately, saying that fate must not be
provoked or something to that effect. He also
was of the opinion that the Chamberlain speech
of 12 October offered a suitable starting point
for further peace talks, until the Fuehrer, in
the evening, gave vent to an opposite opinion.
"Since I had no discussions any more in the
meantime , but received information about the plan
of the offensive which became more and more
definite, today in Dahlem, in the house of the
Minister, I again led the conversation to this
topic and em">hasized my previous statements.
But I soon found out that Herr von Ribbentrop
was not.inclined to go deeper into this matter.
He said that my memorandum was a concent which'
was similar to the terminology of the Anglo-
French propaganda, which, if considered closely
did not want us to strike before the spring of '
1940 when the full war production of Great
Britain would become effective on the Continent.
The reproach of being a defeatist sounded again'
as in the fall of *39. Herr von Ribbentrop
talked about his responsibility which I had
better leave to him. 'We will not discuss this
matter any more.♦
"I countered vith the remark that I was
sorry to hear this because I was in the
possession of arguments which were important
in my opinion but could not be discussed in
such haste, of course.
»Herr von Ribbentrop concluded our conver
sation with a gesture which unmistakably
expressed his desire not to be bothered anv
longer with this matter."
On 9 January 1940 ''rSIZSAECKFR addressed another
memorandum to Ribbentrop regarding Mussolini's letter to
Hitler, in v/hich he says:
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"Th6 T)u.c6 doep not believo in p victory
in the ^'Tept, Any attempt to force such e
decipion, in his opinion, "willlesd to Surope
going Bolshevist. "He therefore wf^nts Germany
not to look for military decisions in the We^t,
but to mature her military aims*...
"It goes v'ithout saying that the Duce*s
p^yIq© is motivatec by Italian egotism, butj^svertheless, it i*^ the advice of a friend.
If it is rejected the Duce will certainly
freedom, of action, and wants to have it.
Hip futile warning will serve him then as an
eycuse with the ^•'estern "lowers. The Duce will
clearly indicate a parting of the roads. It
must be taken seriously."
In Karch 1940 he had the discussion with Sumner
•^Telles to which we have already referred.
These documents do not evidence a desire to forward
plans of aggressive war, but rather both a desire and a
purnose to avert it. Such were his pacific professions,
«nd we now turn to whpt If olPimed to be his sffirmetive
PPrtioipption in these crimes egeinst peece.
On 8 T^ovember 1939 ''lEIZSAECIHR "nd Attolico con-
ferred, pnd tjeizS.ARCT'KE renorted thus (pfter referring
to the offer of the Queen of Hollsnd end the ring of
Belgiiini):
'During the further couP' e of the
.nnver-ation I t old the. Italian that ©t present
Motests were being mede to us by Belgium
of repeated transit flights overS Perritory; from all the.=e oompleintsBelgi-n te reemed in my opinion to be
•'li^ified on the other hand, however. 1JU.tifle . instructed, we should complain
InlS^^tion of Belgianabout the reneepe^
sovereign pj-a Holland would have to
Porsider'preserving their neutrality not
n'fr vtth words, but with deeds, and opposeonly^^''i^^ ^oenrp unless both countries
BngliPli ^oin'thc're utation of exclusively
favori% our opponents." (Smnhasis supplied)
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Unless otherwise explained, this conference does
not indicate an attitude either of.helpfulness, under
standing or sympathy toward Belgium or Holland, or any
hint to the Italians which they could use to prevent war
from spreading to the Lowlands, The assertion by Buelow-
Schwante and. by the defendant that the former *s and
V'UI7>^AECIP5Rinfluence became the exciting factor of
the Dutch and Belgian offers for mediation fails after
examination of the evidence.
The next incident is that arising from the
inquiries of the Belgian Government regarding the
invasion documents found on a German airplane which
grounded or crashed in Belgium on or about 10 January
1940. The Foreign Office, on Pibbentrop^s orders, tried
to conceal the facts. But this action is of no partioulpr
significance unless it was a part of a plan to deceive the
Low Countries as to Germany♦s aggressive intentions.
On 15 January 1940, reports a conversa
tion with Count Davignon, the Belgian Ambassador to Berlin
in which the latter complained about the violation of
Belgian neutrality by German Planes; 'LEIZSAECIpsp said
he '^romi^ed «=n early renly, not only as to current
alleged violations of Belgian territorial rights, but
concerning previous complaints, Fe then "sroceeded to
discuss a series of reports in the Belgian press, all
of which he claimed showed a shocking state of
^^citement
and of military activity, which wa.'^ one-sidedly directed
again-'^ t Germany; th«t the Ambassador admitted this p t
asserted that the military missions were merely
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r^reliminsry safety measures such as already had been
taken by Holland and Switzerland and gave the reason,
therefor- . that everyone in Berlin was breaking of the
German invasion of Belgium and Holland and of the
repeated flying of German planes over his country and
of the warnings which had come from Italy. '^BIZSAECIHiIB
reported that he had re'-lied that Brussels should not be
* influenced by gossip in the streets and that English and
V
French rlanes had been seen at the Belgian frontier and
crossed in flight, and finally, "I could not recognize
? any particular cause for Belgian alarm."
On 16 January 1944 Finister Speak expressed his
annrehensions to the German'?'"inister Buelow-Schwante, in
which he made clear that Belgium would resist any violation
of its neutrality either by '"est or Bast.
On 17 January reported a second visit
frc^ the Belgian Ambassador, in which the latter not only
*
exprsssed hia fears, but mentioned the military mea£?n2;«03
taken against Belgians and the military orders found in
> the airplane heretofore mentioned. "/'EIZSAECiaB renorts
that he answered that he lacked a reason for such behavior,
which he considered unjustified and susnicious, and he
Ftated further that as to the captured military documents,
"I looked surprised and rcr^eated my remark of the day
fi before yesterday that I knew of this story only through
the press."
on ?? January 1940 'JEIZSAFCTP":P reported this
convers'^tion ^^ ith Attolico, who showed him an article
K':'
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in the "Temps" aealing v^ith the emergency landing of a
German nlane near Mecheln, ana•remarked that this was an
important event whlc h h'^;iZSA'5CK'5R had not mentioned on
the occasion of Attolico^s visit the previous week, but
as he, did not desire to enter into the
subject, he merely said that the story was already making
the rounds with the foreign ares^ , and asked Attmioo
whether he could not tell him why it was that the Belgians
were so alarmed a week ago, MillZSAECTCBR further rer^orted
that he could not determine whether the Italians were
informed on this whole question.
The defense submitted B^^hibit 14S, a certified
declaration of the Bclgi^'n J.mbassador, vjhich contains
the follo^^'ing:
"... Bid the Rt'^te Secretary ^^ttempt to
nrevent thi?- invasion? It is difficult for
the undersigned to make any statement on this
subject. At ^11 events, Herr YON
gave the imnression that he hoped to play his
nart in j=n attem'-^t to prevent an extension of
the war in the "'est. On the other hand, he
made no attempt to deceive the undersigned
or to relax his vigilance by stating th«t an
invasion of Belgium ^nd the low Countries was
out of the question."
This is an exceedingly cautious and uninformatlve
statement. The rroseoution exhibit to which we have
referred was offered in evidence on January 1948, end
the affidavit of Count Bavignon was authenticated, on R3
Farch 1948, In view of the meticulous care with which
the o"se of the defense wae Prepared, we deem it extremely
unlikely that the attention of the Ambassador should
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not have been called to Exhibit ?47, and inquiry made
e.F to v-'hether he had not received confidential informa
tion as to the activities of the feared event and
occurrence which had caused such great anpreheneion on
the part of the Belgian Ambaassdor, It is to be
remembered that both *'^IZSA3CFER and Count Davignon
testified to the close personal friendship which they
felt toward each other,
V'hen lavignon made his final call on the day the
German troons initiated their invasion, VJEXZSAECEEE
repeatedly tried to convince the Belgian th^t his govern
ment should cease resistance and gave an emphatic
description of the annihilating consequences to Belgium
if this was not done. The defendant did not e'xplain his
deceptive statements to the Ambassador that he knew
nothing of Germany's intention to invade, and his
explanations of this threat of dire consequences and
annihilation are not only inadequate but his purported
lack of recoilection of what he said is unimpressive.
During all this time, as he himself admits, he
knew that the invarions were planned and prepared, nnd
waited only the strategic moment for their execution,
'^^ ere we to judge him only by these things alone we would
be compelled to the conclusion that he was consciously,
even though unwillingly, p-^rticipating in the plans.
But in determining matters of this kind we may not
substitute the calm, undisturbed judgment derived from
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1Qfter-knov-iedge, v;tiolly divorced froTithe strain and
emotions of the event, for that of the man who was in
the midst of things, distracted by the imnact of the
conflagration and torn by conflicting emotions and his
traditional feelings of nationality.
This much is clear, that ''^IZSAECT^B advised
against the invasions and gave cogent reasons why they
should not be embarked uron. His advice was rejected
and this, rejection was not the first he had suffered.
He had before warned the "^estern Powers and unfortunately
his warnings were ineffective. He had made suggestions
'.'"hich were or could not be carried out. The course of
events had made his prophecies of failure disaster
seem like those of Cassandra. Hven a stout heart for
a time might fail under these circumstances and the
lethargy of futility take its place. That his oposition
revived and that he ^l^^yed a real part in the continuous
underground opposition to and plots against Hitler and
further forcible removal of that incubus from the scene
of action, we have no doubt., Hven heroes have their bad
days,-and while perhaps the defendant cannot be includeil
in that category, he should not be held to e stricter
test.
jiccording to him the benefit of reasonable doubt,
we are constrained to exonerate him. He did not originat'
the invasions and advised against them. He warned
Hibbentrop against the p^estern offensives and the
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utilization of unre?tricteci submarine "warfare. He may
have failed to give the Belgians, Dutch and Italians
specific "warnings of the coming events, but that seems
to be the eytent of his misdoing. Under these circum
stances "we find the defendant ZSAECTUilB FOT GUILTY with
respect to the invasion of the X-ow Countries.
Yugoslavia and Greece. On ?7 October 1940 Mussolini
^ delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Government and almost
immediately thereafter initiated an aggressive "war against
Greece. This "was done "without previous consultation with
y
^ the German Government, although it had strong suspicions,
amounting almost to a certainty, that the invasion was in
T-^rospect. Hitler did not interfere, inasmuch as he himself
had initiated the Danish and Forwegian aggressions without
consulting Mussolini, and felt because of this he should
not Interfere with the ^^roposed Italian incursion.
The defendants ''raiZSAHCKHR and 'COEHMAHU "v^ere
I
advired of Mussolini's nrospective operation. The campaign
broke down during the fall and XA?inter, and military disaster
became imminent. Late in the fall of 1940 Germany commenced
to build up large forces in Eumsnia, first on the pretext
that it was sending a military mission to that country in
order to train the Kumanian Army, and later because of
the alleged necessity of protecting Rumania's oil fields
^ and the danger that the British might establish a Salonika
front.
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From the record it appears that, at first, Hitler's
Pumanian adventure v^as part of his plan of aggression
against Pus^la and that his agreements with Eumania and
the disnatch of troop units there was an actual desire
on his part to -orotect his southern flank:, and his sources,
not only of oil, but of food imnorts. However, as the
Italian invasion not only lost impetus, but suffered
severe military setbacks, he felt it necessary to come
to their support. The alleged presence of British
troop units in Greece was but an excuv^e and not the
reason for his action. Renorts of the German military
Attache and of the German Foreign Office representatives
in Athens clearly disclose this.
But even had the British rendered, substantial aid
to Greece, this did not serve as an excuse for Hitler'b
Invasion^ Italy was the aggressor. It was a signatory
to the Briand-Eellogg Tact and Britain had the right to
come to the aid of Greece, Y?hile Germany, on the other
hand, had no right to come to the aid of the Italian
aggressor. Nor is the argument of self-defense available
to Germany. Ho nation which Initiates aggressive
vjar can
avail itself of the claim of Pelf-defense against those
who have taken up arms against the aggressor. The first
sggreeplon stigmatizes every other act, either in waging
war against or extenaing it to other countries. The
action of Germany in Greece r,ae aggressive ana in viola
tlon of its treaty obligations, was without justifiaf
and in violation of international law.
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I^^Qganoff of Bulgaria that O-ermany v?as in agreement
v^ith the Bulgarians'• desire to obtain an outlet in the
•Aegien Pea aoT^roach betv^een the Marica and Struma Pivers,
but Bulgaria must declare itself unreservedly willing to
^ign the Three-Power'Pact when requested so to do.
On 2 February 1941 ^^ffilZSAECirER informed the
.j Turkish Ambassador that the decisions which the Eeieh
Oovernment had taken concerning the safety of the Balkans
were "irrefutable," On 10 March he informed Eibbentrop
that during the whole of Draganoff's activities in Berlin,
the latter never named any territorial aims but those
an^rised by "us", i.e., Germany.
Notwithstanding these acts, howjsver, there is no
evidence that WZPAECiniT? planned, prerered for or
initiated the war, or that he took any substantial nart
in it. Me find that he should be and is found NOT GUILTY
with respect to the invasion of Greece.
As to Yugoslavia, the story is still shorter. An
attempt was made to gain the adherence of Yugoslavia to
the Tripartite Pact. Most of these negotiations were
%
carried on by Pibbentrop personally. The Yugoslavian
.Government finally agreed to become a signatory to that
nact, but thereupon was overthrown by a coup d*etat and
the new government which took its place rejected the
nroposed agreement and Hitler decided immediately on an
invasion.
From that decision there was no wavering, and
"•MllZSAECI'n '^P had no pert in making the decisions and no
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part in implementing them. He Fhould be and ir found
HOT GUIITJ with regard to the aggressive invasion of
Yugoslavia.
Eussia. On 21 September 1940 ''.'raiZSABCrHlH was informed
by Admiral Buerkner of the OlC'^ f of I-Ceitel^s memorandum of
20 September concerning the military mission'to Rumania,
which stated that the real tasks, which neither Rumania
nor "our own troops" must be allowed to oerceive, were:
(A) To protect the oil fields against attack
by a third power;
(B) Render the Rumanian forces capable of
carrying out certain tasks in accordance
with rigid nlans developed in favor of
German interests; and
(C) To prepare for the employment of German
and of Rumanian troops in the event that
a war with Soviet Russia was being "forced
upon us." (Emphasis surplied.)
On 14 Ser-tember ""rgizSAECYER issued a draft of
instructions regarding the status of the German m.ilitary
mission to Rumania, and its subordination to the German
Minister at Bucharest.
later, toward Christmas 1940, he was informed by
military circles of Hitler*s intention to wage a war
against the Soviet Union, although he asserts that he
received no official information until the late spring
of 1941. On 1 March 1941 TOIZS-AECF^R informed the
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Russian Ambassador, as per instrQotions, regarding
the German troop transports to Rumania and of German
information regarding British troop movements into
Greece; that Turkey would doubtlessly lie low "as we
would certainly not turn against her unless she provoked
us.- I was the more sure of this since our troops would
withdraw when the British danger was prevented, of which
the Soviet Government was nreviously informed in January."
Other than exhibits vjhich disclose that WEIZSAEGKHIR
had knowledge of Hitler♦s plans to invade Russia, and
this he admits, there is no evidence that he took any
affirmative action toward initiating, planning or preparing
for the aggression against that nation.
On the other hand, on 28 April 1941 the defendant
wrote to Ribbentrop advising against a German-Russian
conflict. He said;
"I can summarize in one sentence my views
on a German-Russian conflict: If every Russian
city reduced to ashes were as valuable to us
as a sunken British warship, I should advocate
the, German-Russian war for this summer; but I
believe that we would be victors over Russia
only in a military sense, end would, on the
other hand, lose in an economic sense....
"... But the sole decisive factor is
whether this project will hasten the fall of
England.
*tVe must distinguish between two
•oossibilities:
"(a) England is close to collapse; if we
accent this (assumption), we shall encourage
England by taking on a new opponent, Russia
is no potential ally of the English. England
can expect nothing good from Russia, Hope in
RnsBla is not postponing England's collapse.
AWith. Russia we do not destroy any English
hones •
"(b) If we do not believe in the imminent
collapse of England, then the thought might
suggest itself that by the use of force, we
must feed ourselves from Soviet territory. I
take it as a matter of course that we shall
advance victoriously to Moscow and beyond that.
I doubt very much, however, whether we shall be
able to turn to account what we have v-on in
the face of the well-known passive resistance
of the '^lav. I do not see in the Russian Ptate
any effective ooposition capable of succeeding
the Communist system and uniting with us and
being of service to us. '-'Je would therefore
probably have to reckon with a continuation
of the Stalin system in Eastern Russia and
in Siberia end with a renewed outbreak of
hostilities in the spring of 194?, The window
to the "Pacific Ocean would remain shut.
German attack on Russia wiould only give
the British new moral strength. It would be
interoreted there as German uncertainty as to
the success of our fight against England, '7e
would thereby not only be admitting that the war
was going to last a long time, yet, but we might
actually nrolong it in this way, instead of
shortening it.
"V/EIZ^-AECFER
"This position is drafted in very brief
form, since the Reich Foreign Minister wanted
it within the shortest possible time.
^^A/EIZSAECKER"
Notwithstanding his arguments regarding the necesf^ity
of destroying England, his memorandum is a strong argument
against the invasion of Soviet Russia. And it is his
f
attitude with regard to this charge in which we are here
interested, and not his attitude toward England. In view
of the peculiar mentality of Ribbentrop and the necessity
of couching arguments in terms which he would both under
stand and appreciate, it is quite understan^iable why sound
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advice would be coupled with pyrotechnics against a
third power, namely, Great Britain. The situation here is
different from one where a man argues one way and acts in
^ another. In this case v^BIZ^^AECirEP not only did not act,
but no action would have been effective and even sound
advice was futile.
"fJe have already held that mere knowledge of
aggressive war or of crminal acts is not sufficient,
but it is suggested that ''JEIZSAECrER should have told
the Russian Ambassador that he was aware of Hitler's clans
f
of aggressions against that country. For an abundance of
reasons, this cannot be made the basis of a judgment of
guilt, ^^^e mention but a few. First, he could not talk with
the Ambassador except through an interpreter and the
hazard that the interpreter might betray him was obviously
/ imminent, and the fatal consequences clear; second, there
still remained the possibility either that Hitler might
change his mind or that -circumstances might arise which
would compel him to alter his clans; and third, the
revelation of the actual situation to the Russian Ambassador,
even if it remained secret, would not cause Hitler to change
his plans but would necessarily entail death and suffering
f
to thousands of German youth, themselves innocent of any
part in the planning, preparation and initiating of the
^ aggression. The only course which we think he could
follow or v/iseiy attempt was the one he followed, namely,
to submit the reasons why the Proposed step was likely
to be fatal to the German people. His advice was not
followed and the failure to follow it brought disaster.
....M
The propecution ineiftF, hovever, that there is
criminality in his assertion that he dia not desire the
defeat of his own country. The answer is Who does?
^ One may quarrel with, and oonose to the noint of Violence
and assassination, a tyrant whose i^rograms mean the ruin
of one*F country. But the time has not yet arrived, when
1 any man would vievj with satisfaction the ruin of his
own ^eople and the loss of its- young manhood. To apply
any other standard of conduct is to set up a test that
^ has never yet been suggested as proper, and which, assuredly,
we are not orerared to accept as either wise or good. We
are not to be understood as holding that one who knows
that a war of aggression has been initiated is to be
relieved from crininal fes'^onsibility if he thereafter
^ wages it, or if, with knoi/ledge of its pendency, he does
not exercise such nov-zers and functions as he possesses to
T^revent its taking place. But we are firmly convinced
that the failure to advise a prospective enemy of the
coming aggression in order that he may make military
pre-narations which would, be fatal to those who in good
; faith respond to the call of military duty does not
A
• constitute a crime.
The defendant should be and we find
^ him NOT GUILTY with regard to the aggression against
Russia,
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United ^tates of America. On 15 May 1941 ''/]5IZ?ASCKH!R
wrote a memorandum to Ribbentror which states as follows:
*'Any political treaty between Japan and
the United J^tates is undesirable at present.
The text of the treaty, however, in its present
form v*/ould mean that Japan withdraws from us.
It would leave us alone on the battlefield
against Snglvand and the United States, The
Three-Power Pact vJould be discredited. In
the concluding sentence of Par, II the sanction
ing of the United states help to England is
plainly anti-German (in the English text even
clearer than in the German)•
*'Since the text of the treaty ia already
in Washington it has already had a damaging
effect. One should try to so obstruct it
subsequently to such aji extent that the treaty
will not be concluded. (Definition of the
Japanese treaty interpretation^. -r^rovisions
for effectiveness, dependence of the
effectiveness of II, III, etc.)
"Should the treaty, despite this, still
not be prevented, c«re must be taken that
Janan in reality comes back agpin in the
ranks. The minimum would be that Japan extends
its assistance to Germany on the same principles
- as the United ^tates its aspis-tpnce towards
England."
On 4 September 1941 TOIZSAECIP^ reported his
conversation with Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin,
oshima stated that he had made a report to Tokyo on the
subject of relations of Janan-Ameiica. IVEIZSAECTU? states:
"This opinion of Oshima quite coincides
with the one desired by us, so th-'^t I actually
had little to add. Nevertheless I have also
on this occasion extensively used the ideas
from the order cabled to Tokyo of 25 of last
month - 364 R - and at the end tried to
encourage further the somewhat depressed
i ambassador by telling him I could not at all
imagine that in the Japanese nation and in
accordance with it also in Japanese politics,
there should not, in the end, the military
instincts gain the upper hand."
- Ill -
In November 1941 vraiZSAEGN^P. '^reT;'=re(a e memorandum
which became the basis of a Foreign Office telegram to
the German Ambassador in Tokyo, He states that the German
Military Attache in ^Tashingt-on reported that:
"American war policy during the past few
months based on the assumption that lanan
could be kept out of the vjar. Only thUv® is.
to be explained the division of fleets and
base on Iceland, which permanently ties up
considerable parts of the fleet in the Atlantic.
With every Japanese attack on Russia, China,
Singapore, or Dutch Indies, America is immediately
confronted with the dilemma of either pocketing
an attack on its prestige or saving face by
going to war. Dilemma becomes the more
difficult as U.S. entry into wf=r on tr.'-'o fronts
impairs supply and possibility of aid to
England and not only turns the "Pacific but
also the Atlantic into war theater, thereby
necessitating the splitting up of American
fighting forces as well as convoy protection
to the Far Fast for indispensable raw material
supply.
^""'rior to an American entry into the war
the following is to be assured:
"(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
An above all attitude of Japan,
the unconditional obedience of
Latin-American countries,
conclusion of preparations for
land and air warfare,
complete gearing of war industries,
possibility of being decisive in
the war.
"Roosevelt's and Churchill's threats
addressed to Japan must, as hitherto, not be
evaluated as an expression of strength but as
an expression of concern. One is of the
opinion in America that Japan can be effectively
intimidated, if it is threatened simultaneously
from Singapore and Hawaii. American-English
press to this effect campaign is in progress.
At the same time it is impressed upon Japan
that Japan as a friend of America's and
England's will have entirely different prospects
than as a friend of Germany's. Fuehrer as
master of the British Empire, the Netherlands,
and Russia lould be a much more dangerous
opponent for Ja-oan than the British Empire or
• •
the United •'^t^tes.' A? e mptter of feet, England,
the United states, and Euaaia, want nothing
more than pep.oe and friend^hi^ in the recific
Tfl'ith full regard for intereats,
American tactics, aa in the past two year?, aim
to deceive the opponent and to camouflage its
• own weakness.
^Tlease uae foregoing renort of military
attache in connection with the above-mentioned
cable."
Thus it will be seen that 'w'EIZSAECI'EP was anxious
not only that Ja^an remain an active member of the Tri
partite "^act, and that he favored J"a,pan's expansion and
aggression to the southeast, namely, toward Singapore,
Burma and the Dutch Indies, and alro pgainst Eussie, but
that he was aware that this might bring in its train
intervention on the part of the United ^^tates. But this
does not establish that he favored or recommended an
aggressive war against the United -"^tates. Horevoer, the
record discloses that Japanese acticn was not induced by
German nrom'^ting, but by its own evaluation of the
situation and its own interests, and that the attack on
t^'earl Harbor and the ^hillinines was a surprise to Hitler,
the Foreign Office, and to ''''JSIZSAECITIE.
The German decision to declare war on the United
Ptates was not made by or on the advice of ''JEIZSAECFEH.
Thus the evidence does not establish ^TSIZSAECT'TIFguilt
and we E^^OHEFATE him and find him NOT GUIITY so far as
sggresplve war against the United f-tates of Arerica is
concerned.
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